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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
FEBRUARY 2015
KLARA ZWICKL
MA, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Michael Ash and Professor James Boyce
Rising income and wealth disparities are increasingly viewed as serious economic
and social problems, but what are the environmental consequences of an unequal dis-
tribution of income and wealth? Are low income neighborhoods disproportionately
negatively aected by pollution exposure, and does economic inequality thus manifest
itself in environmental inequality? Are poor or unequal communities less successful in
collectively organizing local environmental improvements and does inequality thus in-
crease pollution exposure for all residents? This dissertation provides some empirical
evidence on these questions.
Chapter 1 analyzes regional variations in environmental disparities in US cities.
Using geographic micro{data from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators on
industrial air pollution exposure and socio-economic data from the US Census at the
block-group level, we nd strong empirical evidence for environmental disparities by
vi
income and race/ethnicity in US cities. However, we also nd some striking regional
variations in the magnitude in cities across the country. A nding that stands out
across regions is that race and ethnicity are stronger predictors for air pollution
exposure in the poorer half of neighborhoods in US cities.
Chapter 2 investigates if neighborhood inequality aects the neighborhood's orga-
nizing capacities for local environmental improvements, using census tract{level data
on industrial air pollution from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators and
income and demographic variables from the American Community Survey and EPA's
Smart Location Database. Estimating a spatial model of pollution exposure, we nd
evidence that overall neighborhood inequality { as measured by the ratio between the
fourth and the second income quintile or the neighborhood Gini coecient { increases
local exposure, whereas a concentration of top incomes reduces local exposure.
Chapter 3 analyzes the socio{demographic correlates of proximity to fracking wells
in ve US states. The geocoded fracking well data were merged with blockgroup{level
socio{economic variables from the American Community Survey and the Smart Lo-
cation database; the socio-economic characteristics of neighborhoods with increased
proximity to fracking activity were compared. I nd that racial and ethnic minorities
disproportionately live near fracking wells, and that educational attainments decline
with proximity to fracking activity. However, there are substantial regional variations
in these patterns.
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INTRODUCTION
For several decades economists have emphasized the benets of economic inequal-
ity, or have considered inequality as an unfortunate but temporal, by{product of
economic development. Over the last years this view has been seriously challenged,
as prominent studies have both documented the historically high levels of income
inequality (Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2003), as well as the negative social and
economic consequences of high income and wealth disparities within societies (Frank,
2007; Wilkinson, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). However, the environmental consequences of
(rising) economic inequality have so far received less attention.
In the US, a wide range of empirical studies on environmental disparities by in-
come, race and ethnicity have documented that poor and minorities suer dispropor-
tionate pollution exposure (for a summary of the literature see chapter 1). Income
inequality translates into environmental inequality, if poor people move to areas with
lower environmental quality (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008) or if lower incomes and/or
income inequality makes communities more vulnerable to siting (Pastor et al., 2001).
Moreover, environmental inequality also leads to more income inequality if the siting
of environmental hazards aects home{values, health, and thus the income and job
prospects of the residents. Empirical evidence suggests that pollution reduces chil-
drens' school performance (Mohai et al., 2011; Currie and Walker, 2009; Pastor et al.,
2004, 2002), and there is further evidence that the socio-economic status health gap,
that is widely discussed in health economics, can partly be explained by unequal ac-
cess to environmental quality (Neidell, 2004). Thus, the relationship between income
inequality and environmental inequality goes in both directions, a vicious circle that
can amplify both forms of disparities over time.
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Inequality is not only disadvantageous for those at the bottom of the income dis-
tribution. Boyce (2007, 2002) emphasizes the relationship between income inequality,
power inequality and environmental outcomes at the country and States level. Baland
and Platteau (2007) discuss the eect of inequality on collective action to conserve
the local commons. Durlauf (1996); Benabou (1996) and Alesina et al. (1999) nd
that group inequality reduces the group members' willingness to pay for the provi-
sion of local public goods, such as public schools. Alesina and Ferrara (2000) nd
evidence for a negative relationship between income inequality and participation in
social activities at the city level. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show experimentally that
group members care for equitable outcomes and that inequality reduces group mem-
bers' willingness to cooperate. (For a detailed discussion of the literature on the
behavioral eects of inequality, see Chapter 2). It is thus likely that inequality also
aects a group's willingness to collectively ght the siting of an environmental hazard,
and bargain with rms and regulators over the implementation of stronger pollution
mitigation technologies in existing facilities.
Inequality can be decomposed into within and between region/group inequality;
the relative magnitude of these categories matters for behavioral and environmental
outcomes. In the US, despite the widely acknowledged existence of residential segrega-
tion, Galbraith and Hale (2008) nd that only a part of the state{level Gini coecient
can be explained by segregation (dened as income inequality between census tracts),
the remainder thus has to be explained by income polarization within geographically
very small units such as census tracts. Coibion et al. (2014) nd that the increase
in inequality within regions explains most of the overall increase in inequality of the
last decades. Regional analyses of inequality are thus of great interest.
In this dissertation, I will analyze both the within and the between dimension of
inequality and pay close attention to regional variations: In chapter 1 and chapter
3 I will focus on the average properties of neighborhoods within states, cities, or
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counties, and explore the correlation between socio{economic characteristics and en-
vironmental quality of these neighborhoods. In Chapter 2, I will focus on the within
dimension and analyze the consequences of neighborhood inequality on environmental
outcomes. I will show that both dimensions of income inequality matter for explaining
environmental disparities.
Chapter 1 analyzes regional variations in environmental disparities in US cities.
Using geographic micro-data from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators
on industrial air pollution exposure and socio-economic data from the US Census at
the block-group level, we nd strong empirical evidence for environmental dispari-
ties by income and race/ethnicity in US cities, however, we nd regional variations
in the magnitude. These may partly be explained by historical and institutional
dierences across regions, and partly by regional variation in environmental policy
and enforcement. A nding that stands out across regions is that race/ethnicity are
stronger predictors for air pollution exposure in the poorer half of US cities, thus
the combination of being poor and being non-white is associated with the highest
pollution exposure burden. This suggests that it is not income or race/ethnicity per
se which leads to higher levels of pollution exposure, but the lack of political power
of communities over rms and regulators.
Chapter 2 analyzes if neighborhood income inequality has an eect on informal
regulation of environmental quality; so unequal neighborhoods are exposed to higher
levels of ambient air pollution as a consequence. I use census tract{level data on in-
dustrial air pollution exposure from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators
model and income and demographic variables from the American Community Survey
and EPA's Smart Location Database. Estimating a spatial lag model and controlling
for formal regulation at the states level, we nd evidence that overall neighborhood in-
equality { as measured by the ratio between the fourth and the second income quintile
or the neighborhood Gini coecient { increases local air pollution exposure, whereas
3
a concentration of top incomes reduces local exposure. The positive coecient of the
general inequality measure is driven by urban neighborhoods, whereas the negative
coecient of top incomes is stronger in rural areas. We explain these ndings by
two contradicting eects of inequality: On the one hand, overall inequality reduces
collective action and thus the organizing capacities for environmental improvements.
On the other hand, a concentration of income at the top enhances the ability of rich
residents to negotiate with regulators or polluting plants in their vicinity.
Chapter 3 analyzes the socio{demographic correlates of proximity to fracking wells
in 5 US states with mandatory disclosure of new fracking wells to the FracFocus reg-
istry from 2011{2013. The geocoded fracking data are merged with income and socio{
demographic variables from the 2006{2010 American Community Survey and EPA's
Smart Locations Database 2010. Comparing the socio{demographics of blockgroups
in close proximity to at least one well with blockgroups in counties with fracking
activity, but no fracking in their vicinity, I nd that both the racial/ethnic minor-
ity shares signicantly increase, while average educational attainments signicantly
decline with proximity to fracking. Environmental disparities by race/ethnicity and
education are stronger when only urban blockgroups are included. However, there are
strong dierences in the observed patterns between states and even between counties
within states.
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CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL VARIATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
INEQUALITY: INDUSTRIAL AIR TOXICS EXPOSURE
IN U.S. CITIES
with Michael Ash and James Boyce
published in: Ecological Economics, Volume 107, pp 494{509 (November 2014)
1.1 Abstract
This paper analyzes how racial and ethnic disparities in exposure to industrial air
toxics in U.S. cities vary with neighborhood income, and how these disparities vary
regionally across the country. Exposure is estimated at the census block-group level
using geographic microdata from the Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We nd that racial and ethnic dispar-
ities in pollution exposure are strongest among neighborhoods with median incomes
below $25,000, while income-based disparities are stronger among neighborhoods with
median incomes above that level. We also nd considerable dierences in the patterns
of disparity across the ten EPA regions. In the two regions with the highest median
exposure (the Midwest and South Central regions), for example, African{Americans
and Hispanics face signicantly higher exposures than whites, whereas in the region
with the next highest exposure (the Mid{Atlantic), the reverse is true. We show that
the latter result is attributable to intercity variations - minorities tend to live in the
less polluted cities in the region - rather than to within-city variations.
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1.2 Introduction
This paper analyzes industrial air toxics exposure disparities by income, race and
ethnicity in U.S. cities, here dened as urbanized areas within Core-Based Statistical
Areas (CBSAs). Exposure estimates are obtained from the geographic microdata
of the Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). We merge the exposure data with U.S. Census data at
the block-group level to obtain income and demographic variables. The ne level of
geographic resolution provided by these data allows us to investigate two questions
that have not been addressed in the literature on environmental inequality.
First, how do racial and ethnic disparities in exposure vary across neighborhoods
with dierent levels of median income? Specically, we test the hypothesis that
racial and ethnic disparities in exposure decline with rising incomes. Because race
and ethnicity are correlated with income, this could yield the result that racial and
ethnic disparities in exposure are large across neighborhoods in the income strata
where most people of color reside, but less pronounced across neighborhoods at the
strata where most non-Hispanic whites reside.
Second, are there signicant variations across the ten EPA regions in patterns
of environmental inequality? Although bound by US EPA's common regulations,
policies, and guidance to help ensure a consistent approach nationwide in the imple-
mentation of environmental requirements, the EPA regions are distinct administrative
units with dierent bureaucratic cultures, State regulations, and data sources. A 2000
GAO report found that variation in enforcement across regions exceeded the desired
and expected level. In explanation of the variation, the report cites \(1) dierences
in the philosophical approaches among enforcement sta about how to best achieve
compliance with environmental requirements; (2) dierences in state laws and enforce-
ment authorities, and in the manner in which regions respond to these dierences; (3)
variations in resources available to both state and regional enforcement oces; (4)
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the exibility aorded by EPA policies and guidance that allow states a degree of lat-
itude in their enforcement programs; and (5) incomplete and inadequate enforcement
data which, among other things, hamper EPAs ability to accurately characterize the
extent of variations." (GAO, 2000, p. 6)
Regulatory dierences among US EPA regions do not exist in a vacuum. Dif-
ferences in demographic, political, economic, and environmental history and geogra-
phy dictate the circumstances under which regulators regulate. At the local level,
Gray and Shadbegian (2009) nd that plant inspections and enforcement actions are
strongly aected by political factors (such as politically active, liberal neighborhoods)
and weakly aected by demographic characteristics. At the states level, Fredriksson
and Millimet (2002) and Konisky (2007) nd that State regulations may inuence
those of neighboring states. This may partly explain the strong regional clustering in
environmental regulation1 (see Appendix Figures A.3) as well as the regional dispari-
ties in weighted median exposure (see Appendix Figure A.4). Segregation, a profound
and enduring feature of the U.S. landscape (Massey, 1993), creates opportunities to
locate hazards in neighborhoods disproportionately inhabited by ethnic or racial mi-
norities. The historical timing of industrialization and de-industrialization and the
racial and ethnic construction of urban space, e.g., through migration, immigration,
redlining, block-busting, and urban renewal projects, create dierent potentials for
environmental justice or injustice.
1It is dicult to obtain a single indicator of State-level regulatory stringency or enforcement.
States with a high rates of high priority violations might be more eective in discovering violations
or might have more rms with high priority violations to begin with. The same holds true for
measures of enforcement action, timeliness and appropriateness of action, or penalty assessment and
collection. The measure we report { the percent of major sources regulated under the Clean Air
Act receiving full compliance evaluations { is a good indicator for inspection/compliance evaluation
coverage. Figure A.3 shows that inspection coverage in some states of the Midwest and South
Central { the two regions with the highest median exposure { is comparably low, whereas inspection
coverage in Mid Atlantic states is generally much higher.
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Sicotte (2013) and Pellow (2000) make a strong case for the geographical and his-
torical specicity of patterns of environmental injustice. The RSEI dataset draws from
a single, consistent national data source, creating an opportunity to assess the varia-
tion of the US EPA regions in fostering environmental justice. We do not have a prior
hypothesis as to better and worse performance among US EPA regions. However, the
US EPA regions correspond, at least loosely, to regions with distinct environmen-
tal and economic histories. For example, EPA Region 5, comprising Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota corresponds nearly exactly to the old
Northwest Territory. These states share a similar history going back to the early
days of the Republic and, perhaps more relevantly, similar experiences during early-
twentieth century industrialization, mid-twentieth migration | especially of African
Americans and poor whites from the U.S. South | and late-twentieth century dein-
dustrialization. Analogously, EPA Region 9, comprising California, Arizona, Nevada,
and Hawaii, can be classied as Southwestern Sunbelt (with exception of Hawaii) with
much development occurring during and after the Second World War and longstand-
ing and newcoming Hispanic populations. Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6 suggest
the existence of strong regional clusters of State-level environmental disparities, both
between whites and minorities and between poor and non-poor households. For these
reasons,we believe that the EPA regions provide a suitable starting point for regional
investigation of patterns of environmental justice. The paper is organized as follows.
After a discussion of the literature in the next section, we describe the data in more
detail in section 3. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on disparities in expo-
sure at the national level and for the ten regions. Section 5 presents our model and
estimation results, where we estimate the eects of income and minority status on
exposure. Section 6 concludes.
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1.3 Literature Review
After the release of the groundbreaking report by the Commission for Racial
Justice (1987), which found strong racial disparities in proximity to hazardous waste
facilities in the United States, national-level analysis of environmental disparities by
race, ethnicity and income has generated a large and growing literature. A number of
studies have analyzed the demographic correlates of proximity to toxics storage and
disposal facilities (Anderton et al., 1994; Been and Gupta, 1997; Mohai and Saha,
2007; Bullard et al., 2008) or other environmental hazards (Hird and Reese, 1998;
Mohai et al., 2009). Other studies have used information on proximity to industrial
facilities in the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory, taking into account dierences in
emissions as well as residential locations (Perlin et al., 1995; Brooks and Sethi, 1997;
Arora and Cason, 1999). An important methodological issue raised by these studies
is the denition of proximity. When considering environmental hazards, how near is
\near"? For example, Anderton et al. (1994) found that when proximity is dened
very restrictively as residence in the same census tract in which a hazardous waste
facility is located (these tend to be industrial tracts, with relatively low population
density), there is no evidence of disproportionately high percentages of minorities. If,
however, proximity is dened to include tracts within a 2.5-mile radius (which tend
to be more densely populated), the percentages of minorities are signicantly higher
than average.2
More recent research has used data on exposure to pollution, rather than simple
proximity to hazards (see for example Milman, 2006). By taking into account such
factors as prevailing wind patterns, stack height and exit gas velocities, as well as
2In a more detailed analysis based on the same research project, Oakes (1997, p.122) observes
that in neighborhoods one mile from TSDF tracts, the percentage of blacks is about 30%|more
than double the average, and that \past the two-mile point, the average [percentage black] falls
fairly consistently until about ve miles, when it becomes less than the mean percentage black for
the whole sample." For discussion, see also Boyce (2007, pp.326-7).
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the mass and toxicity of emissions, exposure-based analysis provides a more accurate
picture of environmental inequalities, as well as a solution to the \how near is near"
problem. National-level analyses of exposure disparities have relied mainly on data
from the EPA's Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (Bouwes et al., 2003; Ash
and Fetter, 2004; Downey and Hawkins, 2008; Downey et al., 2008).3
Apart from these national-level studies, a number of researchers have analyzed
environmental disparities in specic locations. For example, there have been studies
of proximity to waste disposal sites in Houston (Bullard, 1983), metropolitan Detroit
(Mohai and Bryant, 1992), Los Angeles county (Boer et al., 1997), Michigan (Saha
and Mohai, 2005) and North Carolina (Norton et al., 2007). Others have examined
proximity to industrial facilities covered by the Toxics Release Inventory in Ohio
(Bowen et al., 1995), Southern California (Sadd et al., 1999), Minneapolis (Sheppard
et al., 1999), Baltimore (Boone, 2002) and metropolitan Charleston (Wilson et al.,
2012). Several exposure-based studies have also been conducted in specic locations:
Sicotte and Swanson (2007) and Abel and White (2011) use RSEI data to examine
industrial air toxics exposure disparities in Philadelphia and Seattle, respectively;
Morello{Frosch et al. (2001) and Pastor et al. (2005) use National Air Toxics As-
sessment data to analyze exposure disparities in Southern California; Apelberg et al.
(2005) use data from the same source in a study of Maryland; and Brochu et al.
(2011) analyze disparities in exposure to airborne particular matter in the northeast-
ern United States.
Notwithstanding dierences in methodology and data sources, most of these stud-
ies have found evidence that racial and ethnic minorities and low-income communities
tend to face disproportionate pollution hazards. However, there is some controversy
about the causes of environmental disparities, which has become known as the \siting
3Exposure-based studies have also been conducted at the national level using EPA data on criteria
air pollutants (Morello{Frosch and Jesdale, 2005; Bell and Ebisu, 2012).
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versus move in" debate in the literature. In theory, the causal paths that lead to cor-
relations between income, race or ethnicity and proximity/exposure to environmental
hazards could run in either or both directions. If private rms (and public agencies)
are more likely to site hazards in disadvantaged communities and/or less likely to
mitigate them by installing pollution control equipment, the causal pathway runs
from neighborhood characteristics to pollution. However, pollution can also aect
neighborhood characteristics either through its eect on housing location decisions,
because lower property values resulting from environmental hazards make it more
likely that low-income people will move into the impacted neighborhoods, or through
discrimination in credit, mortgage and/or rental markets. The few longitudinal stud-
ies of facility sitings or changes in facility emissions over time have provided empirical
evidence for both causal pathways: Been and Gupta (1997), Szasz and Meuser (2000)
and Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) nd evidence that people move into (or away from)
areas in response to changing environmental quality. Pastor et al. (2001) and Saha
and Mohai (2005) in contrast nd evidence for the "siting" hypothesis, and Saha and
Mohr (2013) nd evidence that facilities with media coverage have lowered pollution.
In practice, it is possible that both siting and move-in are important explanations for
observed environmental disparities, and that a vicious circle between pollution and
neighborhood characteristics increases environmental disparities over time.
The nding that minority eects persist in multivariate analyses that control
for income (for example Ash and Fetter, 2004; Pastor et al., 2005; Mohai et al.,
2009; Bell and Ebisu, 2012) cannot be explained simply by the market dynamics of
property values; insofar as move-in plays a role, these ndings suggest it arises from
discrimination in housing markets that channels minorities to neighborhoods with
greater environmental hazards. Also the nding that racial/ethnic fractionalization
and polarization explain pollution, controlling for the population shares of minorities
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(Cole et al., 2013), provides evidence for explanations that extend beyond individual
housing location decisions.
If siting or housing market discrimination plays an important role in explaining
environmental quality then it is not income or race ethnicity per se, but bargaining
power that matters for environmental outcomes. Since political power strongly cor-
relates with income and race or ethnicity, living in low-income neighborhoods and
being non-white are good predictors of disproportionate pollution exposure. In this
case it is also likely that the coecients for race or ethnicity vary across the income
spectrum: Where purchasing power is lowest, other forms of power disparities (by
race) come into play strongest. The burden thus could be highest for low-income
non-white neighborhoods, and the racial/ethnic gap in exposure could decline with
rising incomes. Whether this is the case can be tested by interacting the coecients
for race or ethnicity and income. With the exception of Morello{Frosch et al. (2001)
and Pastor et al. (2005), who present descriptive statistics of exposure by race or
ethnicity for dierent income groups in California and Apelberg et al. (2005), who
include some race-income interaction terms in their specication for Maryland, the
interaction of race/ethnicity and income has been neglected.
Owing to regional variations in history and institutions, it cannot be assumed
that there is a \one size ts all" pattern of environmental disparities throughout
the United States. Apart from dierences in the methodologies and data employed,
regional dierences may contribute to the diversity of ndings in case studies of
specic locations. Therefore national-level analysis of environmental inequality may
conceal important regional dierences, and studies of specic regions or metropolitan
areas may not be generalizable to the country as a whole.
A few national-level studies have drawn attention to the potential importance
of inter-regional dierences in patterns of environmental disparity. Anderton et al.
(1994) disaggregate across the ten EPA regions in their examination of the demo-
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graphic characteristics of census tracts in which toxic storage and disposal facilities
are located. They nd a statistically signicant higher percentage of Hispanics only
in Region 9 (West/Southwest), but nowhere do they nd a statistically higher per-
centage of blacks. Indeed, in Region 2 (Northeast) they nd a signicantly lower
percentage of blacks residing in these tracts. They do not present region-specic nd-
ings on the demographics of surrounding tracts, which as noted above tend to have
higher population densities and higher percentages of minorities. Perlin et al. (1995)
note substantial dierences across EPA regions in minority populations, income, and
industrial emissions, from which they infer that environmental justice patterns are
likely to vary across regions, too. In a comparison of median exposure of whites,
blacks and Hispanics to industrial air toxics in the 61 largest U.S. metropolitan areas,
Downey (2007) nds substantial variations in the extent of disparities, with the high-
est black/white exposure ratios generally found in the East North Central and East
South Central census regions (corresponding to the contiguous belt of states from
Wisconsin and Michigan in the north to Mississippi and Alabama in the south).
Although national-level analyses have the attraction of comprehensiveness, the
most appropriate scale for thinking about the dynamics of environmental disparities
may be the metropolitan area. When a rm or public agency makes facility siting de-
cisions, it typically is choosing among locations within a given metropolitan area that
has been chosen for reasons such as proximity to infrastructure, inputs or markets.
Only then might we expect that inter-community dierences in minority status or
income become a consideration. Similarly, when people move out of a neighborhood
in response to hazards, or move into a neighborhood in response to lower property
values (or are channelled there by housing market discrimination), they typically do
so within a given metropolitan area. Because national-level patterns reect dier-
ences among metropolitan areas as well as within them, they do not necessarily give
a clear picture of these dynamics. One way to isolate the variation within metropoli-
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tan areas is to employ spatial xed eects in econometric models. Ash and Fetter
(2004), who use such a specication for 1990s data, nd that African-Americans tend
to live both in the more polluted cities and in the more polluted areas within these
cities, while Hispanics tend to live in the less polluted cities but within these cities
\on the wrong sides of the environmental tracts," too. We use a similar model in this
paper, but whereas Ash and Fetter restrict the estimated coecients on minority sta-
tus and income to be identical across the U.S., we allow them to vary across regions
and between lower-income and higher-income neighborhoods.
1.4 Data
To measure industrial air toxics exposure, we use geographic microdata from the
EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model for the year 2007. The
RSEI model includes over 400 chemicals from more than 25,000 facilities in the man-
ufacturing, mining, power generation, waste-management and chemical-management
sectors, which are required to report their chemical releases to the Toxics Release In-
ventory (TRI). TRI was established under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act in 1986, after the 1984 chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India,
raised concerns about toxic releases in the U.S.
The RSEI model includes a fate-and-transport model that uses information on
stack heights, exit gas velocities, wind patterns, and chemical decay rates to estimate
ambient concentrations of the toxic releases for 11,289 grid cells, each 810 meters
square, around each facility. RSEI weights the chemicals by toxicity, dened in the
case of air releases as chronic human health eects from inhalation exposure. Com-
bining the toxicity-weighted ambient concentrations with census data on the size and
age-sex composition of populations residing in each grid cell, the RSEI calculates a
risk-screening indicator for each facility, aggregated across the grid cells impacted
by its releases. Using geographic microdata at the grid cell level, researchers can
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also calculate toxicity-weighted ambient concentrations for each location, aggregated
across all facilities whose releases impact that location. The RSEI model has been
peer-reviewed by experts several times (EPA, 2012a).
While the RSEI data provide the best available measure of exposure to air toxics
from industrial facilities, they only capture one part of overall air pollution. For
example, the data do not include mobile sources (such as emissions from trucks, cars,
and air planes). Using NATA data to compare exposure from hazardous air pollutants
by dierent sources, (Boyce and Pastor, 2012, p. 8) nd that industrial point sources
account for a signicant part of overall exposure, especially in communities where
overall levels of air pollution are high. For example, point sources contribute to 11%
of the total neurological risk in the average tract, but they account for 42% of the
total neurological risk in most polluted tracts.4
This study uses RSEI geographic microdata for the year 2007, which are derived
from the most recent version of the EPA's RSEI model (version 2.3.1). We obtain
income and demographic variables from the 2000 U.S. Census.5 We merge Census
data with the RSEI data at the Census block level and then aggregate the exposure
scores to the block group level, since this is the nest geographic resolution for which
income variables are available in the Census.6 We limit our analysis to urbanized
areas (more precisely, to block groups at least part of which are in an urbanized
area), due to the dierences between urbanized and rural areas in socio-economic
4However, since RSEI and NATA cover a dierent range of chemicals and are based on a dierent
pollution exposure model, point sources from NATA and RSEI are not immediately comparable.
5The seven-year lag between the demographic and pollution variables is not a major concern
since the racial, ethnic and income characteristics of neighborhoods tend to change only gradually.
Moreover, the lag is consistent with the hypothesis that the direction of causality runs primarily
from population characteristics to exposure risks, rather than vice versa.
6Block groups are administrative units constructed by the US Census and local ocials to include
between 600 and 3000 individuals. The average urbanized block group in our dataset includes 1426
individuals.
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characteristics and industrial composition.7 To control for the inuence of outliers,
we censor the exposure variable at the 97th percentile nationwide.8
Exposure to industrial air toxics is calculated as follows:
EXPOSUREjkr =
P
kr(EXPOSUREi  TOTALPOPi Xij)P
kr(TOTALPOPi Xij)
(1.1)
where
 subscript j indexes population subgroups comprising minorities, non-Hispanic
whites (hereafter simply \whites"), the poor (dened by the federal poverty
line) and non-poor, based on Census headcount data;
 subscript k indexes income groups, based on median block group income;
 subscript r indexes the 10 EPA regions (or all regions combines for national
measures);9
 EXPOSUREi is the RSEI exposure measure of block group i ;
 TOTALPOPi is the total population in block group i ; and
 Xij is the share of subgroup j in total block group population.
EXPOSUREjkr therefore is the population-weighted mean exposure of subgroup j
in income group k in region r.10
7Urbanized areas are dened as densely settled territories containing more than 50,000 people
(US Census, 2007, A23). When we include rural areas, too, we generally nd even wider exposure
disparities. The results are available on request.
8Capping the exposure variable at this level reduces the population-weighted average block group
exposure score from 6840 to 4434, reecting the presence of strong outliers that could be due to
reporting errors as well as exceptionally high pollution.
9In cases where a CBSA spans more than one EPA region, we assign it to the region that contains
the largest share of the CBSA's population.
10Since our unit of observation in the study is the block group, our measures do not take account
of within-block group variations in income or exposure.
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1.5 Descriptive Statistics
This section provides a descriptive overview of variations in average exposure to
industrial air toxics by minority status, poverty status, and income. We rst present
national-level results, and then present comparable results for the ten EPA regions.
1.5.1 National overview
Figure 1.1 shows the national average exposure for four subgroups: non-poor
whites, poor whites, non-poor minorities and poor minorities.11 Among both whites
and minorities, the poor face higher average exposure than the non-poor, and among
both the non-poor and the poor, minorities face higher exposure than whites. Average
exposure for poor minorities is 29% higher than for non-poor whites.
Figure 1.1. Average Exposure by
Poverty and Minority Status, National
Level
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Figure 1.2. Average Exposure by
Income and Race/Ethnicity, National
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To provide a ner-grained picture of exposure disparities, in Figure 1.2 we distin-
guish four racial/ethnic groups { non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans, Hispanics,
and other minorities { and present their average exposure in eight median blockgoup
income strata. For all four racial/ethnic groups, we nd an inverted-U shaped re-
11Poor households are households below the Census poverty line, which varies by size of family
and number of related children under 18 years. For a family with two adults and two children, the
poverty threshold in the 2000 census is $17,463 (at 1999 dollars).
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lationship with income: in the lowest brackets, average exposure rises with income,
but it declines after median block group income reaches a level of about $25,000 per
household. This pattern is consistent with the ndings of previous studies (Morello{
Frosch et al., 2002, for example). The rising portion of the curves may reect positive
associations among industrial activity, incomes and pollution across cities, while the
falling portion may reect disparities in facility siting within cities.
A striking feature of Figure 1.2 is that minority status disparities are much wider
in the lower-income strata. In the lowest income group, African-Americans have an
average exposure 47% higher than that of whites. Hispanics and other minorities,
on the other hand, have lower average exposures than whites. This reects the fact
that Hispanics and other minorities tend to live in cities with lower levels of indus-
trial pollution. Within cities, however, Hispanics tend to face higher exposure than
whites (Ash and Fetter, 2004). Above median block group incomes of about $25,000,
dierences in exposure are mainly associated with dierences in income: for all four
subgroups, exposure declines monotonically as income rises. Pollution exposure dif-
ferences across lower-income neighborhoods thus appear to be strongly correlated
with their racial/ethnic composition, whereas exposure dierences among middle and
upper-income neighborhoods are most strongly correlated with dierences in income.
Race/ethnicity and income themselves are strongly correlated, as shown in Ta-
ble 1.1. More than half of African-Americans and Hispanics in urbanized areas live
in block groups with median incomes under $25,000, compared to fewer than 12% of
whites. Combining this fact with the patterns seen in Figure 1.2, we can conclude
that for most whites, neighborhood income appears to be the main correlate of dis-
parities in exposure to industrial air pollution, whereas for most African-Americans,
the racial composition of neighborhoods looms larger.
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Table 1.1. Population distribution across median block group incomes by
race/ethnicity
Household income ($000) White African American Hispanic Other Minority
<15k 4.2% 30.6% 33.8% 8.6%
15-25k 7.6% 26.2% 20.4% 9.6%
25-35k 12.5% 16.1% 15.2% 9.1%
35-50k 16.1% 10.9% 11.5% 10.6%
50-75k 19.1% 7.9% 9.0% 16.0%
75-100k 21.0% 5.5% 6.3% 22.9%
>100k 19.5% 2.8% 3.8% 23.1%
LowInc 34.3% 73.5% 67.0% 48.1%
HighInc 65.7% 26.5% 33.0% 51.9%
Note: LowInc refers to the percentage living in the poorer half of each city, HighInc
to the percentage living in the richer half of the city.
1.5.2 Regional variations
There are substantial regional variations in exposure to industrial air toxics, as
shown in Figure 1.3. The highest median exposures are in the EPA's Midwest, South
Central, and Mid-Atlantic regions, in that order. These are also the top three regions
when comparing the 75th and 90th percentiles of exposure. Disparities in exposure
by race, ethnicity and income in these regions therefore are of particular interest.
Figure 1.4 shows average exposures by poverty and minority status for each of the
ten EPA regions.12 The general patterns seen at the national level (in Figure 1.1) are
also apparent at the regional level: poor minorities consistently have a higher average
exposure than non-poor minorities; poor whites have a higher average exposure than
non-poor whites in all regions but the Central Mountains and West/Southwest; poor
minorities have a higher exposure risk than poor whites in all regions except for the
Northeast, Mid-Atlantic and Central Plains; and non-poor minorities have a higher
exposure risk than non-poor whites in all regions except for the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic.
12See Appendix Figure A.1 for denitions of the EPA regions.
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Figure 1.3. Industrial Air Toxics Exposure by EPA region in U.S. cities
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Figure 1.4. Average Exposure by Poverty and Minority Status, EPA regions
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Among the three regions with the highest median exposure, the Mid-Atlantic is
anomalous in that average exposure of whites exceeds average exposure of minorities.
This suggests that patterns of disparity are subject to signicant regional variations.
The importance of regional variations is still more apparent in Figure 1.5, which
depicts average exposure for the four race/ethnicity groups across the eight income
strata. In all regions there is some convergence across race/ethnicity groups as income
rises. In the region with the highest overall exposure (Midwest), African-Americans
and Hispanics have higher average exposure than whites throughout the income range.
In the region with the second highest overall exposure (South Central), African-
Americans have much higher average exposures than whites until they converge at
an income level of roughly $50,000, while Hispanics generally have lower average
exposures than whites. In the Mid-Atlantic, the region with the third highest over-
all exposure, the pattern is quite dierent. Whites have a higher average exposure
than African-Americans throughout the income range, and a higher exposure than
Hispanics in all but the lowest two income brackets.
The results reported in this section reect disparities among as well as within
CBSAs. The econometric results presented in the next section allow us to compare
disparities within cities to these overall disparities.
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Figure 1.5. Average Exposure by Income and Race/Ethnicity, EPA Regions
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1.6 Econometric Analysis
To shed further light on the relationships among industrial air pollution expo-
sure, race/ethnicity, and income at both the national and regional levels, this section
presents estimates of econometric models that allow us to examine not only the inter-
actions between minority status and income but also to identify patterns of within-city
variations by controlling for inter-city variations in exposure.
1.6.1 Model
We rst estimate the following model:
ln(1 + EXPOSUREicr) = 0r +Xicr  Xr + kicr  k + k2icr  k2 + c + icr (1.2)
where EXPOSUREicr is the exposure of block group i in city c in region r ; Xicr
is a vector of variables indicating the percent of African Americans, Hispanics and
other minorities in the population of the block group; kicr is the median household
income in the block group; c is a xed eect for city c in region r ; and ijr is the
error term. Because the exposure variable is skewed to the left { many block groups
have little or no industrial air pollution { we add 1 (to include observations with zero
values) and take its logarithm. The quadratic term allows for concavity or convexity
in the relationship between exposure and median income.13 The inclusion of city-
specic xed eects sweeps out between-city variation. For comparative purposes, we
also present estimation results without city xed eects. We weight by block group
population. To control for spatial autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the
city level.
13We also estimated specications with dichotomous dependent variables, such as dummies for
block groups in the top percentiles of exposure. In general, these produce results similar to those
reported here.
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We then estimate a second model that splits the observations into block groups
that are above and below the city's median income, to test whether race and ethnicity
have dierent eects in the poorer versus richer halves of the city:
ln(1 + EXPOSUREicr) = 0r +Xicr  LOWINCicr  X;LOWINC;r+
Xicr HIGHINCicr  X;HIGHINC;r + c + icr
(1.3)
where LOWINCicr is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if median income
of the block group is below the city average, and 0 otherwise; and HIGHINCicr
takes the value 1 if median income of the block group is above the city average,
and 0 otherwise. Summary statistics for the variables used in the estimations at
the national level and for the ten EPA regions are reported in Appendix Tables
A.1 and A.2. The dierences between mean and the median (p50) values in the
percentages of whites and minorities, reported in Appendix Table A.1, is an indicator
of widespread residential segregation. For example, the average block group in U.S.
cities has 13% African-Americans and 17% Hispanics. Yet half of the block groups
have only 3.2% or fewer African-Americans, and half have 5.4% or fewer Hispanics.
There are substantial regional variations in the percentages of minorities, as shown
in Appendix Table A.2. The percentage of African-Americans living in the average
block group varies from 3% in the Central Mountains to 21% in the Southeast, and
the percentage of Hispanics varies from 4% in the Central Plains to 31% in the
West/Southwest.
1.6.2 Results
The results of estimating equation 1.2 without xed eects are reported in Ta-
ble 1.2. At the national level and in eight of the ten EPA regions, the estimated
coecient for the African-American share of block group population is positive and
statistically signicant. The coecient at the national level is 0.93, implying that
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controlling for income, exposure in an entirely African-American block group would
be 93% higher than in an all-white block group (since whites are the omitted group
in the model), and that a 10 percentage point increase in the number of African-
Americans in a block group, coupled with a 10 percentage point decrease in the
number of whites, would be associated with a 9.3% increase in exposure. Only in the
Mid-Atlantic region is the coecient for African-American negative and statistically
signicant.
The results for Hispanics in this specication are mixed. In six regions the esti-
mated coecients for Hispanics are positive and statistically signicant, but at the
national level and in four regions it is negative and statistically signicant, implying
that in these cases as the percentage of Hispanics goes up, pollution exposure goes
down. The results for other minorities are similar.
To assist in interpretation of the estimates of the quadratic income function, we
report f'(0.5) { the slope at an income of $50,000 { and the p-value for a joint
signicance test of the linear and quadratic terms at this income level.14 At the
national level and in ve regions, the slope is negative and statistically signicant
at $50,000, indicating that as income goes up, pollution exposure declines. The
slope of -0.15 at the national level implies that an increase of income from $50,000
to $60,000 decreases pollution exposure by 1.5%. The slope on income at $50,000
is positive and statistically signicant in only two regions, the Central Mountains
and the West/Southwest, both of which show relatively large disparities by race and
ethnicity.
14We also report the turning point of the quadratic function (f'= 0). At the national level, we nd
an inverted-U relationship with a maximum at $38,600. Again, however, we nd substantial inter-
regional dierences. The Mid-Atlantic region, for example, shows a U-shaped relationship (rather
than an inverted U) with a minimum at $202,000, indicating that exposure diminishes throughout
the income range.
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The results of estimating equation 1.2 with the inclusion of city-specic xed
eects are reported in Table 1.3. At the national level and in six of the regions,
the coecient for African-American is positive and statistically signicant. Smaller
coecients, compared to those in the specication without xed eects reported in
Table 1.2, imply that both within and between city disparities contribute to overall
exposure inequality. In New England, the Central Plains and the Central Mountains,
the estimated coecient for African-American is no longer statistically signicant in
the xed-eects specication, suggesting that in these three regions disproportionate
exposures of African-Americans are attributable mainly to between-city variations.
In the Northeast, comparison of the results in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 shows that there are
signicant within-city disparities that are oset by opposing between-city variations
in the model without xed eects. Similarly, in the Mid-Atlantic, the negative and
statistically signicant reported coecient in Table 1.2 can be seen to be entirely
attributable to between-city variations, that is, to a tendency for African-Americnas
to live in less polluted cities in this region.
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For Hispanics at the national level and in the Southeast and South Central regions,
the estimated coecient is negative in Table 1.2 but positive in Table 1.3, indicating
that while Hispanics tend to live in less polluted cities compared to whites, within
these cities they tend to live in more polluted neighborhoods { a nding in line with
that of Ash and Fetter (2004). However, results for Hispanics again vary consider-
ably across regions. In the Mid-Atlantic and Pacic Northwest regions the coecients
are negative and statistically signicant in Table 1.2, but no longer statistically sig-
nicant in Table 1.3, suggesting that in these two regions Hispanics tend to live in
the less polluted cities, and within these cities in areas with pollution comparable to
that faced by whites. In four regions (Northeast, Midwest, Central Mountains and
West/Southwest) Hispanics face higher pollution exposure both overall and within
cities. In the two remaining regions (New England and Central Plains) Hispanics
tend to live in the more polluted cities, but within these cities they do not face
statistically signicant exposure disparities. The national-level results for other mi-
norities similarly imply that, like Hispanics, they tend to live in less polluted cities,
but within these cities in more polluted neighborhoods. Again, however, these result
are not generalizable to all regions. The slope on the income term at $50,000 at the
national level is negative but barely signicant at the 10% level. It is negative and
statistically signicant in ve of the regions, and not statistically dierent from zero
in the others.
To analyze the impacts of income in the absence of controls for minority status,
we also re-estimated the xed-eects model simply as a quadratic function of income.
The results are reported in Table 1.4. At the national level and in every region, the
estimated slope at $50,000 is negative and statistically signicant, ranging from -0.56
to -1.67. At the national level the slope is -0.97, implying that as the median income
of the block group goes up by $10,000, exposure drops by 9.7%. The stronger income
eects without controls for minority status reect the strong correlations between
30
minority status and income seen in Table 1.1 and shown at the regional level in
Appendix Figure A.2.
Finally, to test the hypothesis that minority status matters more for pollution
exposure in lower-income neighborhoods, we estimated the model of equation 1.3, in
which the race and ethnicity variables are interacted with a dummy variable indicating
whether median block group income is below or above the CBSA average. Whites
living in block groups with above-average incomes are the omitted group, so the
estimated coecients indicate how exposures vary compared to this reference group.15
We again include city xed eects. The results are reported in Table 1.5.
At the national level, the coecients are positive and statistically signicant for
all seven interaction terms. The coecient of 0.17 for low-income whites implies that
whites living in block groups with below-average incomes face 17% more exposure
than whites living in block groups with above-average incomes. Across regions, the
most consistent result is that the estimated coecient for African-Americans living in
lower-income neighborhoods is positive in all ten regions and statistically signicant in
all but one of them. At the national level, African-Americans living in the poorer half
of the city have a 76% higher pollution exposure risk than whites living in the richer
half. Strong ndings also can be observed for Hispanics living in the poorer half of
the city, for whom the estimated coecients are positive and statistically signicant
in seven regions as well as at the national level. At the national level, compared
to whites living in the richer half, Hispanics in the poorer half face a 133% higher
pollution exposure. Whites living in the poorer half of the city face a signicantly
higher exposure in ve regions, and other minorities living in the poorer half face
signicantly higher exposure in four regions. In no region do the residents of lower-
15Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix Table A.2.
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income neighborhoods of any race or ethnicity face signicantly lower exposure than
whites living in upper-income neighborhoods.
The estimated coecients for minorities living in upper-income neighborhoods are
preponderantly positive, and in many cases statistically signicant, implying that they
too, often face higher exposures than whites living in upper-income neighborhoods.
For African-Americans the coecients are positive and statistically signicant in four
regions; for Hispanics, in seven; and for other minorities, in four. Negative and
statistically signicant coecients are found only in two cases, one for Hispanics and
one for other minorities.16
To assess the robustness of the results reported in Table 1.3, we also added several
control variables: education, measured by the percentage of adults in the block group
with a high school degree; median value of owner-occupied homes; population density;
and manufacturing activity, proxied by the percentage of workers in the block group
employed in manufacturing. At the national level and in most regions, the estimated
coecients on race, ethnicity and income are robust to the inclusion of these controls,
retaining the same signs and remaining statistically signicant, although with smaller
magnitudes in some cases. The extra variables add little to the explanatory power
of the models, and since the interpretation of their coecients is not straightforward
(e.g., manufacturing activity can be considered an intermediary variable; education
and median home value are correlated with income; and median home value can be
considered an outcome variable), in Table 3 we report only the more parsimonious
specication.17
Our results are broadly consistent with the hypotheses that both minority status
and income matter for pollution exposure, and that the eects of minority status
16The results in Table 1.5 are robust to inclusion of income and quadratic income as control
variables. These results are available on request.
17The results of these additional specications are available on request.
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tend to be stronger among neighborhoods in the lower half of the income spectrum {
which is where most minorities live. There are considerable variations across regions,
however. In the two regions with the highest average exposure to industrial air
pollution { the Midwest and South Central regions { the estimated coecients for
African-Americans and Hispanics in the lower-income half of the city are consistently
higher than for those in the higher-income half.
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1.7 Conclusion
This study has explored inequalities in the distribution of industrial air pollution
by estimating neighborhood exposure as a function of minority status, income and
interactions between the two, at the national level and in the ten EPA regions. We
nd that exposure varies with minority status most strongly among neighborhoods
with median household incomes below $ 25,000, whereas variations in neighborhood
income matter more above $ 25,000. Most minorities reside in the former, while most
non-Hispanic whites reside in the latter. Perceptions as to the relative importance
of minority status and income as correlates of pollution exposure therefore may vary
between minorities and whites.
At the national level, minorities living in the lower-income half of their city face
signicantly higher exposures than whites living in the upper-income half. The same
is true in most regions: for African-Americans, the dierence is statistically signicant
in nine of the ten regions, for Hispanics in seven, and for other minorities in four.
In no region do we nd exposures of minorities in lower-income neighborhoods to
be signicantly lower than those of whites in upper-income neighborhoods. At the
national level, and in ve of the regions, whites living in the lower-income half of the
city also face signicantly higher exposures than whites living in the upper-income
half, and in no region do they face signicantly lower exposures. These ndings
conrm the enduring salience of race, ethnicity and household income as correlates
of air quality in the United States.
The results reveal marked variations in regional patterns of environmental inequal-
ity, however, and these may help to explain some of the divergent ndings of studies
that have focused on specic regions or metropolitan areas. For example, we nd
that exposures of African-Americans are signicantly higher than those of whites in
the Midwest and South Central regions (the two with the highest average exposure
levels), but we nd the opposite in the Mid-Atlantic region (which ranks third), a re-
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sult attributable solely to dierences among cities in the Mid-Atlantic regions rather
than within them. Similarly, comparing the two regions with the largest Hispanic
population shares, we nd that Hispanics in the West/Southwest tend to live both
in more polluted cities and in more exposed neighborhoods within them, whereas in
the South Central region they tend to live in less polluted cities but again in more
polluted neighborhoods within a given city.
Further research is necessary to understand the reasons for these regional dier-
ences and their implications for environmental policy. A relevant question is to what
extent the regional variations reported here are an outcome of industrial siting or
residential location decisions, and to what extent they reect dierential enforcement
of environmental standards within regions.
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CHAPTER 2
INFORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION: DOES
NEIGHBORHOOD INEQUALITY MATTER?
with Mathias Moser, Vienna University of Economics and Business
2.1 Abstract
This paper analyzes if neighborhood income inequality has an eect on informal
regulation of environmental quality, using census tract-level data on industrial air
pollution exposure from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators and income
and demographic variables from the American Community Survey and EPA's Smart
Location Database. Estimating a spatial lag model and controlling for formal reg-
ulation at the states level, we nd evidence that overall neighborhood inequality {
as measured by the ratio between the fourth and the second income quintile or the
neighborhood Gini coecient { increases local air pollution exposure, whereas higher
top incomes in the neighborhood relative to those in the county reduces local expo-
sure. The positive coecient of the general inequality measure is driven by urban
neighborhoods, whereas the negative coecient of top incomes is stronger in rural ar-
eas. We explain these ndings by two contradicting eects of inequality: On the one
hand, overall inequality reduces collective action and thus the organizing capacities
for environmental improvements. On the other hand, a concentration of income at
the top enhances the ability of rich residents to negotiate with regulators or polluting
plants in their vicinity.
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2.2 Introduction
This paper analyzes if neighborhoods with higher levels of income inequality are
less successful in advocating for informal environmental regulation and suer higher
air pollution exposure as a consequence. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests
that where formal regulation of pollution is less than one hundred percent eective, af-
fected communities can bargain for environmental clean-up with local regulators and
polluting plants in their vicinity (Pargal andWheeler, 1996; Pargal et al., 1997). Infor-
mal regulation has been found to depend on neighborhood characteristics, especially
neighborhood education levels or average income, since wealthier, better educated
neighborhoods have superior organizing capacities. However, so far the relationship
between neighborhood income inequality and informal environmental regulation has
been neglected.
The eect of within{group inequality on individual and collective outcomes has
become an important eld of research in behavioral economics. Previous evidence
suggests that group inequality reduces the group members' willingness to pay for the
provision of local public goods (Durlauf, 1996; Benabou, 1996; Alesina et al., 1999)
and aects the group's ability to engage in collective action to preserve the local
commons (Baland and Platteau, 2007; Akbulut and Soylu, 2012). This argument can
be extended to informal regulation of air pollution. However, the eect of inequality
on air quality is not as clear as the eect of inequality on other local public goods,
since it is not directly the local tax payers, but the polluting rms who pay for its
provision, for example through installing additional pollution mitigation technology.1
On the one hand, one can expect that local inequality may reduce organizing capac-
ities and therefore informal environmental regulation, and leads to higher local air
pollution exposure as a consequence. On the other hand, a concentration of income
1Firms might then pass on (parts of) the costs through price increases, so the total costs are
likely to spread out across society.
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at the top may enhance the ability of rich residents to advocate for improvements in
environmental quality that benet the entire neighborhood.
We will test the relationship between inequality and informal regulation empiri-
cally using a similar approach as Pargal et al. (1997), estimating air pollution as a
function of neighborhood characteristics, controlling for formal regulation at a broader
geographical scale. However, instead of using the volume of emissions as a dependent
variable, we will use census tract-level industrial air pollution exposure data from
EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI). Using exposure instead of
raw emissions data has the advantage that it takes into account the variation in
damage to the local environment depending on various factors such as stack heights,
wind patterns, or geographical properties, which Pargal et al. (1997) discuss as an
important factor to include. We merge the RSEI data with income and demographic
characteristics from the American Community Survey and EPA's Smart Location
Database. Due to strong spatial correlation in the dependent variable, which can
lead to a serious bias in the estimates due to spatial spill-over eects, we estimate a
spatial lag model. We thereby improve the methodology on explaining variation in
environmental quality across U.S. neighborhoods.
We nd that, on the one hand, overall income inequality { as measured by the
q4/q2 ratio or the neighborhood Gini coecient { is associated with higher local air
pollution exposure. Since state xed-eects capture most of the variation in formal
regulation, our ndings suggest that neighborhood income inequality reduces informal
environmental regulation. This eect is driven by urban neighborhoods. On the other
hand, a concentration of income at the top { as measured by the income ratio between
the top 5 percent of the tract and the top 20 percent of the county { is associated with
lower air pollution exposure, suggesting that top incomes increase informal regulation.
The latter eect is particularly strong in rural tracts. This suggests that the degree of
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urbanization has an eect on how inequality aects informal environmental regulation
and thus environmental outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a literature review in
section 2, section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics and maps, and
the spatial model. Section 4 reports regression results and section 5 concludes.
2.3 Literature Review
As opposed to formal regulation, which includes both command and control and
market-based environmental policy, informal regulation refers to local environmen-
tal improvements that have been achieved by residents' bargaining with rms and
regulators. Informal regulation depends strongly on the organizing capacity of the
neighborhood, i.e. the neighborhood's ability to threaten the polluter with negative
publicity, consumer boycotts, compensation demands, possibly up to the threat of
physical violence (Pargal et al., 1997, p. 433f). When informal regulation is eective,
the expected penalty for polluting is high enough to induce the rm to at least partly
reduce the pollution externalities by installing mitigation technology, and at most
shut down the polluting plant.
While Pargal and Wheeler (1996) provide evidence for substantial degrees of in-
formal regulation for Indonesia, Pargal et al. (1997) nd that informal regulation also
plays an important role in the U.S., a country with high levels of formal regulation.
This suggests that the ability of neighborhoods to spur action by formal regulators
may also be an important channel for informal regulation. The two pre{requisites
for informal environmental regulation are, rst, a gap between formal regulation and
local environmental preferences, and second, a community's ability to exert politi-
cal, social, or economic pressure. Education and average income have been found to
increase a community's leverage to achieve local environmental improvements. It is
plausible that income inequality is also important in this context.
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This paper builds upon two strands of literature: rst, the literature on the be-
havioral consequences of group{ or neighborhood{inequality, especially the eects of
inequality on collective action; and second, analyses explaining variations in environ-
mental quality by socio{economic characteristics.
2.3.1 Inequality and Collective Action
Previous research has emphasized that successful collective action depends on the
group's ability to cooperate, which in turn is aected by the composition of the group
(Janssen and Ostrom, 2007). The eect of inequality on social capital formation has
been demonstrated by Putnam (2000), who distinguishes between bridging versus
bonding social capital, where the former refers to the case when individuals partic-
ipate in heterogeneous groups and get into contact with people with very dierent
socio{economic backgrounds, whereas bonding social capital refers to participation in
relatively homogeneous groups. Inequality increases the group's heterogeneity, which
may be useful for bridging, but harmful for bonding social capital. Inequality may
therefore have dierent eects on bridging versus bonding social capital: On the one
hand, inequality can adversely aect the ability of the community to collaborate and
thus reduce bonding social capital. On the other hand, inequality, that goes along
with group heterogeneity, can increase bridging social capital, and thus the ability
of some group members to network with inuential parties and allies outside the
community.
Empirically there is a lot of evidence that inequality reduces a group's ability to
cooperate due to the decline in trust, and negative eects from inequality aversion
in general. Exploring state{year variation in levels of income inequality and social
capital, Putnam (2000) nds a strong negative correlation. Durlauf (1996), Benabou
(1996) and Alesina et al. (1999) nd that inequality reduces collective action as the
increased heterogeneity in the group negatively aects the group's decision making
42
power, e.g. by deciding on a tax rate to nance the public school. Using data from the
General Social Survey from the 1970s to 1990s, Alesina and Ferrara (2000) demon-
strate that higher income inequality and racial/ethnic fragmentation at the city level
are associated with lower participation in social activities, such as church groups,
school service groups, sports groups and political groups. They nd the strongest
negative eects of inequality on group membership for groups where members inter-
act directly and excludability is low. In a follow{up study also using General Social
Survey data, Alesina and Ferrara (2002) nd that trust is lower amongst historically
disadvantaged group members (women and minorities) and in groups with high levels
of income inequality. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show experimentally that group mem-
bers care about equitable outcomes and that the economic environment | including
the level of income inequality | reduces group members' willingness to cooperate.
Conducting trust experiments, Anderson et al. (2006) demonstrate that group het-
erogeneity reduces trust, although the ndings are sensitive towards the experimental
setting.
Inequality can also play a role in local environmental conservation. If the famous
\tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) | a scenario where missing property rights
result in over{use and subsequent depletion | is extended to a situation where the
group is heterogeneous, individual incentives to agree to common rules will depend
on one's own relative economic position, as well as whether the use of the resource
increases or declines with income and wealth (Baland et al., 2007.) It is likely that the
demand for clean air increases with income and wealth, since there is evidence that
rich people move to cleaner neighborhoods (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). However, the
lack of opportunities to do so could give poor people a higher interest in the environ-
mental conservation of a specic neighborhood. On the contrary, it is also possible
that the rate of home-ownership, which is increasing with income, reduces geographic
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mobility and therefore increases the rich people's interest in the conservation of a
specic location.
Based on this evidence, we hypothesize that inequality reduces bonding social
capital and thus has a predominantly negative eect on collective action, with the
consequence that unequal neighborhoods are less successful to achieve informal reg-
ulation and therefore suer higher local industrial air pollution exposure. However,
this could be partly counter{acted by inequality increasing bridging social capital.
We will distinguish between these two eects, by including two dierent inequality
measures in the specication: rst, a measure of overall income inequality, such as a
quintile income ratio or the neighborhood Gini coecient; and second a measure of
top incomes of the tract relative to high incomes of the county, such as the income
ratio of the top 5 percent of the neighborhood to the top 20 percent of the county.
2.3.2 Environmental Disparities by Socio{Economic Status
There is widespread evidence that low{income households and racial/ethnic mi-
norities suer disproportionate pollution exposure in the US. Measures of the distri-
bution of environmental quality across the US suggest that environmental inequality
is much higher than income inequality (Boyce et al., 2014). A number of studies have
found empirical evidence that industrial facilities with toxic releases (Perlin et al.,
1995; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Arora and Cason, 1999), toxic storage and disposal fa-
cilities (Anderton et al., 1994; Been and Gupta, 1997; Mohai and Saha, 2007; Bullard
et al., 2008) and other environmental hazards (Hird and Reese, 1998; Mohai et al.,
2009) are disproportionately located in poor and minority neighborhoods. More re-
cent studies have used modelled exposure data instead of proximity to environmental
hazards, arguing that the latter rely on somewhat arbitrary assumptions on the dis-
tance of the pollution eect. Exposure data are mainly obtained from two sources:
EPA's Risk{Screening Environmental Indicators model (see for example Ash and Fet-
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ter, 2004; Downey and Hawkins, 2008; Abel and White, 2011; Zwickl et al., 2014) and
EPA's National Air Toxics Assessment model (Pastor et al., 2005; Morello{Frosch and
Jesdale, 2005).
Previous studies on environmental disparities by socio-economic status have typ-
ically estimated pollution exposure as a function of income, race/ethnicity and some
non{discriminatory control variables such as population density. Most studies found
statistically signicant eects of both income and race/ethnicity (Mohai et al., 2009;
Bell and Ebisu, 2012; Zwickl et al., 2014). In these studies, the coecients for
race/ethnicity remained signicant even after controlling for income. Furthermore,
some studies have found that the extent of segregation at a specic location is pos-
itively associated with pollution exposure at this location (Lopez, 2002; Morello{
Frosch and Jesdale, 2005; Cole et al., 2013).
In theory, the correlation between industrial pollution exposure and neighborhood
characteristics could arise in both directions: On the one hand, industrial rms can
site hazards disproportionately in disadvantaged communities or use less clean tech-
nologies in these communities because they face less regulatory pressure. On the
other hand, poor and minority households can move into areas with lower air qual-
ity because of lower property values or due to housing market discrimination. The
dominant causal pathway is dicult to ascertain, since most studies have used very
detailed geographic micro{databases with large cross-sectional, but no time dimen-
sion. While this strong regional disaggregation is necessary to avoid wrong inference
due to the so called 'ecological fallacy'2, it impedes longitudinal analysis.3 The few
2The problem of 'ecological fallacy' refers to the situation where spatial patterns observed at
a broader geographical scale such as the county or zip{code level cannot be replicated for ner
geographic resolutions (Anselin, 2002).
3Most recent studies on environmental inequality use census tracts as unit of observation. Census
tract boundaries are changed as a consequence of population growth or decline. Since population
changes could be correlated with changes in demographic characteristics of interest for explaining
environmental quality, census boundary changes cannot be assumed to be exogenous. For that
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studies that have established causality by tracking facility sitings or facility emissions
over time, have found that discriminatory siting practices in poor and minority com-
munities play an important role (Pastor et al., 2001), and there is evidence that rms
reduce their toxic emissions in response to media{coverage (Saha and Mohr, 2013).
Thus, even though it is likely that the causal relationship also runs from pollution
to socio{economic characteristics (Been and Gupta, 1997; Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008),
a signicant part of the relationship between pollution and neighborhood charac-
teristics is due to industrial siting/clean{up based on neighborhood characteristics.
This goes in line with the view that informal regulation is an important predictor of
environmental quality.
The importance of this causal pathway is also supported by the fact that con-
trolling for income, other demographic characteristics of a neighborhood, such as
the percentages of minorities, are signicant predictors of air quality (Pastor et al.,
2005; Mohai et al., 2009; Bell and Ebisu, 2012), suggesting that population sort-
ing in response to property values is not the whole story. Moreover, race/ethnicity
are stronger predictors of air quality in the poorer half of U.S. cities (Zwickl et al.,
2014), in neighborhoods with the lowest organizing capacities for informal regulation.
Furthermore, previous studies have found that besides racial/ethnic minority status,
racial fragmentation is an important predictor for poor air quality (Morello{Frosch
and Jesdale, 2005; Cole et al., 2013). They explain this by arguing that fragmentation
reduces a community's ability to engage in collective action.
However, the relationship between income inequality at the neighborhood level
and pollution exposure has not been examined empirically. By analyzing environ-
mental quality at a ne geographic resolution, we will start with a similar model as
the literature on environmental disparities by socio-economic status. We will then
reason it is dicult to create a longitudinal census tract{level database to control for pre{siting
dynamics.
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add measures of neighborhood inequality to test for the eect of inequality on the
neighborhood's ability to organize for local environmental improvements, controlling
for variations in environmental quality at a broader geographical scale.
2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Data
We use the geographic micro-data from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indi-
cators (RSEI) 2010, which we merge with the American Community Survey 2006{2010
and EPA's Smart Location Database to obtain income and demographic variables at
the census tract{level. Census tracts are geographic units that were created by the
Census Bureau and local ocials for social analyses of neighborhoods. The Census
2010 denes tracts as areas of around 4,000 people that are split by legal and ge-
ographical boundaries, the entire US consisting of around 74,000 tracts, including
Alaska and Hawaii. Our sample includes 68512 blockgroups in the 48 contiguous
states, for which income inequality measures are available.4 Census tracts have been
used to analyze neighborhood{eects in various other elds such as unemployment
(Topa, 2001), sub-prime lending (Richter and Craig, 2013) or housing markets and
segregation (Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009).
RSEI is based on a model by the Environmental Protection Agency, which uses
information on releases from over 400 chemicals from more than 25,000 industrial
facilities, that have to report their emissions to the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),
as well as a fate{and{transport model5 to estimate ambient air pollution for grid
cells of 810 meters square. The chemicals are weighted by toxicity, which is dened
as chronic human health hazard from inhalation exposure, and then the toxicity{
4Most missing observations lie in very rural areas with a low population density and too little
survey responses for reliable income inequality estimates.
5Which includes stack heights, exit gas velocities, wind patterns and chemical decay rates
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weighted exposure from each chemical is added.6 The resulting variable, that was
merged with census data at the block-level and then aggregated to the census tract-
level using area weights7, is a good measure of residential exposure to air pollution
from industrial facilities, as it depends both on the number and activity of facilities in
an area, as well as the technology used by the facilities to reduce hazardous releases
(e.g. production methods, stack heights or the installation of scrubbers). The variable
thus reects variations in informal regulation at the neighborhood level.8
We obtain census tract{level demographic and income variables from the 5{year
average estimates of the American Community Survey (ACS) 2006{2010. Summary
statistics for the variables included are reported in section 3.4. Since 2005, the ACS
has replaced the Census long form, which was last conducted in 2000 and has been the
most widely used source for socio-economic variables at detailed geographic resolution
down to the census block (for demographic variables) and block group (for income
variables). ACS is a continuous survey that is conducted for a smaller sample every
year, based on which 1{year, 3{year and 5{year averages are estimated, where the
latter are considered most reliable for ne geographic resolutions. Since our dependent
6RSEI hereby ignores cumulative health eects, which could be larger than the sum of toxicity{
weighted exposure.
7We thank Michael Ash for providing access to the census tract{level RSEI data.
8Even though the RSEI model was peer{reviewed repeatedly (EPA, 2012a) and is at present
the best available source to obtain census tract{level industrial air pollution exposure data, it is
important to mention three shortcomings. First, RSEI could be biased because of mis{reporting
by TRI rms if monitoring is insucient. If mis{reporting itself is a function of neighborhood
characteristics, because rms are less likely to under{report their emissions in communities with less
access to information, this could lead to wrong inference. However, if it is more likely that rms
under{report their emissions in poor and minority neighborhoods due to less regulatory oversight in
line with the informal regulation hypothesis, the bias is against our hypothesis of unequal exposure.
Second, since RSEI is derived from a model, the results depend on various assumptions of the model,
including the relative toxicity of chemicals or their atmospheric dispersion. However, since the model
is reviewed periodically by expert groups, the estimates reect state-of-the art scientic knowledge
on the environmental damage and human health hazard from these chemicals. Third, RSEI only
captures industrial point sources and excludes air pollution from other sources (such as agriculture
or mobile sources from cars or air planes), which could be positively or negatively correlated with
industrial pollution. However, inequality could also aect informal regulation of other sources of air
pollution.
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variable is from 2010, we use ACS 5{year average estimates from 2006{20109 The main
advantage of the American Community Survey is that, compared to the census long
form, it includes some additional variables of interest for explaining environmental
disparities, such as variables on the distribution of income at the census tract{level.
10
We add the share of industrial employment, as well as other employment, popu-
lation density and land-use variables from EPA's block group-level Smart Locations
Database, that we aggregated to the census tract-level.
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The following model specication is commonly used in analyses of environmental
disparities at the neighborhood level, which is also the basis for our empirical analysis:
EXPOSUREi = 0 + 1 minorityi + 2 medinci + z  zi + s + i (2.1)
The dependent variable, EXPOSUREi is the measure of industrial air pollution
exposure in the census tract i and captures both variation in facility siting and pollu-
9The small lag between demographics and pollution, is in fact a good way to focus on pollution
as outcome variable and reduce problems of reverse causality of median or average neighborhood
income.
10Two shortcomings of the ACS are worth emphasizing: First, the ACS has been criticized for
non{random variations in model uncertainty, specically regional and demographic variation in
the margin of errors of the income variables. Especially low{income inner{city census tracts, and
census tracts in the South and Southwest have higher margins of errors than others (Folch et al.,
2014). Second, the time period from 2006 to 2010 was characterized by the nal stage of the boom
and subsequent burst of the U.S. housing market bubble and the following Great Recession. It is
thus a very heterogeneous time period, where households' characteristics changed dramatically and
therefore the results could be sensitive to timing (whether a household was surveyed in 2006 or
2010). For this reason, we do not include some of the most sensitive variables with this respect,
such as housing values. Since the variables from the ACS represent residential | as opposed to
workplace | socio{economic characteristics, we are estimating exposure disparities at the residential
location. However, overall exposure disparities, that also take into account outdoor air pollution at
the workplace location, could dier substantially.
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tion mitigation technology. minorityi is a vector of variables indicating the percent
of African Americans, Hispanics and other minorities in the population of the tract.
Since minorities are disproportionately exposed to pollution, compared to the omitted
group non-Hispanic whites, the coecients of these variables are expected to be posi-
tive. medinci is the median household income in the tract. In general, this coecient
is expected to be negative in line with the informal regulation hypothesis: as income
increases, demand for environmental quality and organizing capacities increase and
pollution exposure declines. We additionally control for industrial activity by includ-
ing the percent of industrial jobs in total employment, as well as urbanization. zi is
a vector of these additional control variables.
It is important to note that income can be endogenous, if wealthier residents move
out of polluted areas (e.g. Pargal et al., 1997, p. 440), and industrial activity can be
an intermediate variable, since it can explain both pollution and socio-economic char-
acteristics of a neighborhood. However, the fact that the race/ethnicity coecients
are still statistically signicant even when controlling for income and industrial activ-
ity, strengthens the case for discriminatory industrial siting as the dominant causal
pathway, since income controls for housing aordability and industrial activity for
job availability, both of which may cause people to move to more polluted areas.
We further include state xed eects c to control for variation in formal regulation
between states, which can be substantial (Boyce et al., 1999). The inclusion of xed-
eects also controls for other important variables explaining the dependent variable
at a broader scale, such as the availability of skilled workers, infrastructure, transport
and logistics, or the availability of natural resources.
To test the hypothesis that income inequality aects environmental quality through
reducing informal regulation, we add measures of income inequality to the above equa-
tion as additional explanatory variables.
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EXPOSUREi = 0+1minorityi+2medinci+3inequali+ziz+s+i
(2.2)
inequali stands for a vector of these variables: We will add both an overall
measure of within{neighborhood inequality, such as the Q4/Q2 ratio, or the Gini
coecient, and a measure of top incomes in the neighborhood relative to other neigh-
borhoods, measured by the ratio between the top 5 percent of the tract to the top
20 percent of the county. We expect the overall inequality measures to have pos-
itive coecients, since higher inequality reduces collective action and therefore the
environmental quality. The top income shares are expected to have negative coef-
cients, since an income concentration enhances the ability of the rich to demand
environmental improvements.
Controlling for median or average incomes, the causal pathway of the overall
inequality measure is likely to run from inequality to pollution, in line with the
informal regulation hypothesis, since there is no straightforward way how pollution
might aect the level of inequality when holding average incomes constant. However,
the top income variable can be endogenous if rich people move out of polluted areas.
We therefore consider the coecient of the overall inequality measures as reliable, the
coecients of the top income shares { similar to the coecients of median income {
have to be interpreted with more caution.
2.4.3 Estimation Approach
Most previous studies in the eld have assumed that the dependent variable and
the error term in equation 2.1 are independently distributed and not correlated across
space, and have thus estimated OLS. However, if one or both of these assumptions
are violated, it can seriously bias coecients and standard errors of OLS estimations.
In our analysis, we are especially concerned with spatial correlation in the dependent
variable due to spatial spillovers, which can lead to biased estimates. We therefore
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estimate a spatial lag model that controls for these spill{overs (see Brueckner, 2003).
Anselin (2002) distinguish between theoretical and data{driven reason for estimating
a spatial lag model. In our case, a theory{driven motivation is the understanding
of pollution spill-overs as externalities. While a rm may place a toxic facility in
a poor neighborhood where the community's ability for informal regulation is low,
the subsequent fate{and{transport of emissions will be also cause externalities to
other neighborhoods with a similar or dierent poverty status. Estimating a spatial
lag model allows us to distinguish between direct and indirect pollution eects of
facility locations, based on which we can answer dierent questions: First, which
communities are primarily targeted by the facility siting, and second, how high is
the overall burden in communities based on socio{economic characteristics? A data{
driven motivation in our case is that the air quality variable is obtained from facility{
level emissions data and a fate-and-transport model, which explicitly models spillovers
at the 810810 meter grid-cell level. It is therefore likely that even after aggregating
the grid-cell pollution score to the census tract-level, there will still be a substantial
amount of modelled spill-overs. If the spatial structure in the data is correlated with
the explanatory variables, this can bias the results. Estimating a spatial{lag model
therefore also addresses the data{driven concerns on spillovers and should generate
unbiased estimates, compared to OLS. We will present robustness tests estimating
a spatial error model, which restricts the spatial structure to the error{term (for a
discussion of spatial models see Anselin, 1988), however, for the theoretical reasons
above, we prefer the spatial lag model.
Figure 2.1 shows a cloropleth map of the dependent variable, which is very concen-
trated across space and suggests the existence of substantial spill{overs. Morevoer,
while a large part of tracts have rather low levels of industrial air pollution, several
pollution hot{spots can be identied with very high levels.
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Figure 2.1. Air Pollution Exposure (censored toxconc) Cloropleth Map
Both spatial lag and spatial error models can be written in a nested form as
yi = W yi + X + s +   = W i + i (2.3)
whereW is a NN spatial weight matrix,W yi is the spatially-lagged dependent
variable, X a matrix of explanatory variables and s are state xed eects. Due to
the spillover-structure of our variable of interest, we will put an emphasis on the lag
model. For the lag model it is assumed that  = 0, so that there is no spatial pattern
in the error structure. The lag model thus simplies to
yi = W yi + X + s + i i = N(0; 
2
i )
We loosen the assumption of  = 0 by additionally estimating a spatial error
model, which sets  = 0 in equation 2.3 to focus on the spatial structure in the error
term. To control for potential heteroscedasticity, we estimate White heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors.
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Choosing the structure of W is crucial for detecting and controlling for spatial
autocorrelation. W denes a set of neighbours for each observation, so that its
elements wij are positive if two observations are related and zero otherwise. However,
choosing an appropriate spatial weights matrix is not trivial. If the assumed weight
matrix does not reect the true drivers of autocorrelation correctly, the model may
(still) be subject to misspecication (Bivand et al., 2013). Since there is no broadly
agreed choice for W in the context of our data11, we use a series of dierent matrix
specications, but mainly focus on so-called k-nearest neighbors (KNN), with k = 5.
This implies that every census tract is assumed to be correlated with its ve nearest
neighbours, measured via tract centroids.12
The estimation procedure for equation 2.3 follows Kelejian and Prucha (1998)
and more specically the implementation of these methods in the R spdep library
described in Bivand et al. (2005). In essence, the estimation of this model can be
based on the spatial two stage least squares estimator (S2SLS) (Anselin et al., 1980;
Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Kelejian et al., 2004) where the spatially lagged dependent
variables serve as instruments for the lagged endogeneous variable. An overview of
the estimation procedure is given e.g. by Anselin (2011).
2.4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used. Because Toxconc,
the pollution exposure score obtained from RSEI, is skewed to the left | since many
11The biggest challenge is the unequal shape and size-distribution of tracts, outlined in gure 1.
Since every census tract has roughly 4000 residents, low-populated tracts in the center of the US are
much larger than the high-populated tracts especially in the eastern part of the US. Furthermore,
some tracts are \islands" within other tracts. These properties make distance-based spatial weights
infeasible and contiguity-based spatial weights unreliable
12Additionally we provide robustness checks of this choice by assuming varying numbers of nearest
neighbours. We also consider alternative methods for creating the weights matrix such as the Queen-
style contiguity criterion as well as distance-based measures. Distance-based weights are chosen in
such a way, that each observation has at least one neighbour. In general, our results are very robust.
Results are available upon request.
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tracts have little or no industrial air pollution | we add 1 to include observations
with zero values and take its logarithm. To reduce the inuence of outliers we censor
Toxconc at the 97th percentile. Our dependent variable thus is the censored log of
Toxconc.
Min. Median Mean Max. Std. Dev.
Toxconc 0.00 613.57 2995.93 28294.13 5972.51
Censored ln(Toxconc) 0.00 6.42 6.12 10.25 2.43
% African American 0.00 0.03 0.13 1.00 0.22
% Hispanic 0.00 0.06 0.14 1.00 0.21
% Other Minority 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.99 0.09
Median Income 5.82 49.86 55.78 250.00 26.93
Mean Income 8.60 60.78 69.64 561.13 35.34
Share Industrial Employment 0.00 0.17 0.25 1.00 0.22
Majority Urbanized 0.00 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.46
Tract Gini 0.18 0.40 0.41 0.78 0.06
County Top 5% 0.16 1.35 1.59 13.20 0.92
Q4/Q2 Ratio 1.15 2.32 2.42 43.66 0.54
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Independent variables included in dierent specications are the following: the
percentage of African Americans, the percentage of Hispanics and the percentage
of other minorities, each ranging from zero to one; the median annual household
income of the tract ranging from below $5800 to $250,000, which is the value at
which ACS censors some income variables for condentiality reasons; mean income
ranging from $8600 to over $560,000, the share of industrial employment ranging
from 0 to 1, a dummy variable indicating whether the majority of the census tract's
population lives in an urbanized area (which is the case for 71% of tracts); and three
measures of income inequality. While the Tract Gini and the Q4/Q2 ratio measure
general tract-level inequality, the Tract Top5/County Q5 variable measures the ratio
between the top 5% of the tract to the top20% of the county, and thus whether a
tract has a concentration of top incomes in relation to the corresponding county. The
median value of this variable is 1.35, suggesting that in half of the tracts there is no
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Figure 2.2. Moran Scatterplot of Toxconc (ln)
Note: Horizontal axis: ln(toxconc), vertical axis: spatially lagged ln(toxconc) using
KNN-5 spatial weights
strong income concentration in comparison to the county according to our measure.
However, the maximum is over over 13, thus the top 5 percent in this tract have an
income that is more than thirteen times as high as the average income of the top 20
percent of the county. The Gini coecient ranges from 0.18 to 0.78 with a median
that is close to the mean and around 0.4. The Q4/Q2 ratio ranges from slightly above
1 to over 43. In the median tract the Q4/Q2 ratio is 2.3, implying that the average
family incomes of the top 40 percent are more than twice as high as the corresponding
incomes of the bottom 40 percent.
Regarding the spatial autocorrelation in our dependent variable, we present a
globalMoran Scatterplot in Figure 2.2, which describes the correlation in air pollution
exposure levels between a tract and its spatial lag (i.e. the weighted level of the
neighboring tracts according to the weights matrix). As can be seen there is a strong
spatial correlation measured using the default KNN{5 weights with a high number of
56
observations in the lower left quadrant (Low{Low) as well as the upper right corner
(High{High). This is also indicated by the highly signicant Moran's I statistic for
this variable with a value of 0:93.
2.5 Estimation Results
In the rst step, before testing the relationship between neighborhood inequal-
ity and industrial air pollution exposure, we estimate a standard model explaining
environmental disparities by socio-economic status as discussed in section 2.3.2 and
compare OLS with the spatial lag and the spatial error models (see table 2.2). All
three equations include state xed-eects and White{standard errors. In all spec-
ications, the percentages African Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities are
positive and statistically signicant, so are the dummy for urbanized neighborhoods
and the percentage of industrial employment, however in the latter two models the
coecients drop in size, due to the spatial structure in our data.
In the OLS estimation (column 1 of table 2.2) a coecient of 1.16 for African
Americans suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in African American resi-
dents coupled with a 10 percentage point decrease of Whites (the omitted category)
is associated with a 11.6 percent increase in pollution exposure within the state.
However, due to spatial correlation in the dependent variable, this eect could be
over{estimated, or in fact could be a combination between a direct and an indirect
eect. In the spatial lag model the coecient of 0.13 suggests that a 10 percentage
point increase in African American residents is associated with an increase in total
pollution exposure by 1.3 percent, controlling for indirect pollution spill-overs from
neighboring tracts. The coecients for Hispanics and other minorities are roughly
of the same magnitude. This also suggest that the majority of the eect of the OLS
estimates is due to spatial spill-overs. However, since part of the spill-overs might
be an unintended by{product of facility{siting or clean-up in a nearby community,
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Table 2.2. Baseline Regressions
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
Constant 4.848*** 0.191*** 5.030***
(0.062) (0.034) (0.164)
% African American 1.158*** 0.130*** 0.166***
(0.041) (0.010) (0.025)
% Hispanic 1.316*** 0.143*** 0.234***
(0.048) (0.012) (0.031)
% Other Minority 1.661*** 0.161*** -0.026
(0.092) (0.028) (0.049)
Median Income 0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanized 2.083*** 0.267*** 0.357***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.013)
% Industrial Empl. 0.652*** 0.110*** 0.111***
(0.035) (0.011) (0.012)
 0.933***
(0.006)
 0.948***
(0.005)
Observations 68512 68512 68512
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.98 0.366
Moran's I 0.90 0.11 0.95
***: Signicant at 0.1%; **: Signicant at 1%; *: Signicant at 5%
the nding of prevailing positive coecients in the lag model strengthens the case for
environmental injustice.
The coecient of median income is statistically signicant but close to zero in
all three specications and switches signs between OLS and the spatial models. The
urbanization dummy and the percentage of industrial employment are positive and
statistically signicant in all three specications, suggesting higher pollution exposure
in urbanized tracts and tracts with higher industrial activity.
The results of the error model are generally very robust, the size of the coecients
for most variables lie between OLS and the lag model. The circumstance that the
coecients are still statistically signicant when controlling for spatial correlation in
the error gives us the condence, that our results are not only obtained with the
theoretical assumptions of the lag model.
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Table 2.3. Baseline Regressions inc. Inequality
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
Constant 4.795*** 0.127*** 4.985***
(0.075) (0.035) (0.164)
% African American 1.145*** 0.119*** 0.160***
(0.041) (0.010) (0.025)
% Hispanic 1.308*** 0.140*** 0.235***
(0.048) (0.012) (0.031)
% Other Minority 1.631*** 0.139*** -0.033
(0.092) (0.029) (0.049)
Median Income 0.004*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanized 2.079*** 0.264*** 0.356***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.013)
% Industrial Empl. 0.651*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.035) (0.011) (0.012)
Q4/Q2 0.028 0.026*** 0.018***
(0.015) (0.004) (0.005)
County Top 5% -0.025* -0.015*** -0.011**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.004)
 0.933***
(0.006)
 0.948***
(0.005)
Observations 68512 68512 68512
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.98 0.367
***: Signicant at 0.1%; **: Signicant at 1%; *: Signicant at 5%
Table 2.3 adds two measures of income inequality: the ratio between Q4/Q2 of the
tract and ratio between the tract top 5 percent and the county top 20. Both variables
try to capture dierent aspects of social interaction: While the quantile ratio serves as
a measure of overall inequality, the second measure focuses on the relative importance
of high income earners in a tract. The variables already included in table 3 are robust
towards adding these two variables. The signs of the inequality variables are robust
across all three specications, and similar in size, however the Q4/Q2 ratio is only
signicant in the spatial models. The results are in line with our hypotheses about
the eect of inequality on pollution levels. On the one hand, the overall inequality
measures are associated with higher pollution levels, and therefore measure the eect
of social cohesion discussed earlier. On the other hand, we nd that a concentration of
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Table 2.4. Spatial Lag Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 0.932*** 0.935*** 0.934*** 0.934*** 0.947*** 0.943***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.126*** 0.038 0.153*** 0.130*** 0.260*** 0.188***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.035) (0.044) (0.049)
% African American 0.125*** 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.110***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
% Hispanic 0.147*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.136*** 0.137***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
% Other Minority 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.152*** 0.135*** 0.124***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
% Industrial Empl. 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.096*** 0.104***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Urbanized 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.266***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean Income 0.000***
(0.000)
Q4/Q2 0.028*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004)
County Top 5% -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Median Income 0.001*** 0.000* -0.000** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tract Gini 0.380***
(0.039)
Q5/Q2 0.009***
(0.002)
Q4/Q2 Urban 0.034***
(0.005)
Q4/Q2 Rural -0.024**
(0.008)
Cty Top5 Urban -0.006** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.003)
Cty Top5 Rural -0.057*** -0.050***
(0.007) (0.010)
Gini Urban 0.486***
(0.038)
Gini Rural 0.000
(0.070)
Observations 68512 68512 68512 68512 68512 68512
Pseudo R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
***: Signicant at 0.1%; **: Signicant at 1%; *: Signicant at 5%
high income earners is correlated with lower levels of pollution. This nding supports
the assumption, that rich individuals may have dierent preferences for pollution or
are able to back their demands through economic resources (e.g. through campaigns).
Table 2.4 nally reports various robustness checks of the spatial lag-model in
table 2.3. In column 1 we control for mean income instead of median income. This
is done as mentioned above to reduce reverse{causality, as it is unlikely that at a
given level of average income, changes in air quality aect the neighborhood's income
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distribution. Our results are very robust towards this change. In column 2 we replace
Q4/Q2 by the neighborhood Gini coecient, which is another general inequality
measure, although non{linear by construction. This variable also has a positive and
statistically signicant sign | a ten percentage-point increase in the Gini can be
related to a 3.8% increase in pollution levels. In column 3 we add the Q5/Q2 ratio
instead of the Q4/Q2 ratio, which is a more extreme measure of top income earners.
In principal this substitution conrms the robustness of the inequality eect, although
the coecient of Q5/Q2 is smaller, probably a result of its narrower denition. In
column 4 we drop the share of top income earners in relation to the county (county
top 5%), which does not have an eect on the coecient of Q4/Q2.
It can be argued that the eect of inequality may vary between urban and rural
areas, due to what Pargal et al. (1997) refer to as the \visibility eect" of a polluting
plant, that is lower in urban areas, where average levels of pollution are higher.
However, neighborhood organizing capacities could also vary by population density,
and the inuence of rich individuals on individual regulations could be stronger in
rural areas. In the last two columns, we therefore interact Q4/Q2 and the Gini with
the urbanization measure as dummy to test if the eect of inequality on informal
regulation varies by the degree of urbanization. We nd that the eect of the overall
inequality measure diers between urban and rural areas: whereas in urban areas,
overall inequality is associated with an increase in pollution exposure using both
Q4/Q2 and the Gini as inequality measure. In rural areas, Q4/Q2 turns negative,
and the Gini turns zero and not statistically signicant. The top income measure is
negative in both urban and rural areas, however the coecients are larger in rural
areas. As we noted, the results for the overall inequality measures are more reliable,
since the top income measures can be endogenous. The \move-out" eect could
be even stronger in rural areas, where people are more mobile, already take long
commuting distances to their workplace into account, and might be less likely to move
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away from environmental hazards. Furthermore, since over 70 percent of US census
tracts are classied as urbanized, where we found that inequality has a predominantly
negative eect, we conclude that local inequality increases environmental pollution
by reducing neighborhoods' organizing capacities in line with the informal regulation
hypothesis.
As LeSage and Pace (2010) point out, the immediate interpretation of coecients
in the lag model can cause erroneous interpretations, and they suggest to consider
partial derivatives instead, to distinguish between direct and indirect eects. This is
due to the fact that a change in inequality may inuence the tract's own pollution
level but through the spatial spillover there could also exist a feedback eect from the
neighbouring tracts. We follow the approach of LeSage and Pace and simulate these
eects from the variance-covariance matrix to draw inference. The results from this
exercise are presented in table B.1. Both direct and indirect eects are found to have
similar signs as compared to the total eects presented before. Especially the direct
eects are of similar size and magnitude (see table 2.4) and therefore our conclusions
remain valid.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates if the degree of neighborhood inequality matters for in-
formal regulation of industrial air pollution in the United States. Using data on
industrial air pollution exposure from EPA's Risk Screening Environmental Indica-
tors model and income and demographic data as well as control variables from the
American Community Survey and EPA's Smart Location Database, we estimate a
spatial lag model explaining air pollution exposure and controlling for variation in
regulation and environmental quality at a broader geographical scale. We nd that
general income inequality measures, such as the neighborhood Gini coecient, or the
Q4/Q2 ratio, are associated with higher pollution exposure, suggesting weaker infor-
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mal environmental regulation in unequal neighborhoods. However, a concentration
of top incomes, as measured by the tract top 5% to the county top 20% ratio is as-
sociated with a reduction in air pollution. While the former eect is driven by urban
neighborhoods, the latter eect is especially strong in rural neighborhoods, suggesting
that wealthy rural residents are most likely to achieve environmental improvements
by bargaining with rms or regulators. Since over 70% of U.S. neighborhoods are
classied as urban, we conclude that inequality has a predominantly negative eect
on the neighborhoods ability to achieve local environmental improvements.
Our ndings contribute both to the literature on informal regulation, by identify-
ing an additional factor that determines communities' organizing capacities and thus
the variation of environmental quality at a smaller geographical scale, as well as to
the literature on the behavioral eects of income inequality. Specically, we show
that it can be useful to distinguish between dierent forms of inequality { overall
inequality and top income concentration { and between dierent behavioral eects in
urban and rural areas.
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CHAPTER 3
SOCIO{ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN PROXIMITY TO
UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS DRILLING
3.1 Abstract
The extraction of unconventional natural gas through hydraulic fracturing has in-
creased rapidly over the last years. In the United States, decentralized environmental
regulation has lead to a strong spatial concentration of unconventional gas drilling
in states, counties and local areas with lax environmental regulations on hydraulic
fracturing. This paper analyzes if this variation in regulation has led to environmen-
tal disparities by socio{economic status. Using data on the geographic location of
fracking wells from ve states with mandatory disclosure to the FracFocus website
from 2011{2013, merged with blockgroup{level socio{economic and land{use vari-
ables from the 2006{2010 American Community Survey and EPA's Smart Location
Database 2010, I compare the socio{demographics of blockgroups in close proximity
to at least one well with blockgroups in counties with fracking activity, but no fracking
in their vicinity. I nd that both the minority shares signicantly increase and educa-
tional attainments signicantly decline with proximity to fracking, whereas there are
no clear dierences with respect to average incomes or wages. Environmental dispar-
ities by race/ethnicity and education levels are even stronger when only urban areas
are included. However, there are considerable between{state and between{county
dierences in the observed patterns.
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3.2 Introduction
While the availability of large unconventional gas resources1 has been known for
decades, only the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have
made it economically feasible to recover natural gas from these sources, due to the
low permeability and low recovery factors compared to conventional natural gas.
Hydraulic fracturing refers to the process of injecting large volumes of water and
some chemical additives in the rock to create fractures and release the gas that would
otherwise be inaccessible using conventional drilling methods. The composition of
the hydraulic fracturing uid varies greatly depending on the geological properties
of the rock; the chemicals used, which may be released to the environment through
spills or leakages, range from relatively harmless to highly toxic.
The extraction of unconventional natural gas has increased rapidly since the mid{
2000s. Since the U.S. has the second largest shale oil and fourth largest shale gas
reserves in the world, and natural gas production from conventional reserves is steadily
declining, the advance of unconventional natural gas drilling has had a substantial
economic impact. Estimates suggest that the reserves are sucient to produce gas
for the next hundred years at current rates of consumption (Helm, 2011). However,
the overall economic, environmental, and human health consequences of the natural
gas boom are highly contested, and peer{reviewed academic studies have only started
to emerge recently. One controversial topic is the overall greenhouse gas footprint of
natural gas compared to coal. This could be much higher than the direct emissions
via end-use consumption, because of high methane leakages during unconventional
1Unconventional natural gas resources are classied in three categories: tight gas, coalbed
methane, and shale gas, where the latter is experiencing the strongest production increase in recent
years. All three are characterized by low permeability and low recovery rates using conventional
methods, thus making recovery only economically feasible with massive hydraulic fracturing oper-
ations, as well as horizontal drilling. The use of hydraulic fracturing is not limited to natural gas
production, but also unconventional oil production. The dierence between oil and gas production
is continuous, in fact, many wells produce both.
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natural gas production. Another debate deals with the local economic consequences
of unconventional gas drilling, and the importance of the \boom{town" phenomenon,
according to which the benets are only temporary and much shorter than often
assumed, whereas the environmental damages could outweigh the benets in the long
run.
Environmental damages from fracking can arise at various stages of the production
process: methane leakages due to faulty well pads, contamination through waste{
water disposal, air pollution during production, resource depletion due to large water
withdrawals in arid regions. First academic studies have reported serious environmen-
tal damages in fracking areas, but were criticized for not controlling for pre{fracking
environmental damages. Furthermore, currently there exist no well-designed epi-
demiological study on humans that can prove health damage from fracking. Evidence
from farm animals suggests, however, that fracking could pose major public health
concerns.
Despite this uncertainty, regulation at the national level is practically non{existent
because the 2005 Energy Policy Act excluded fracking from the main national envi-
ronmental laws, including the \Safe Drinking Water Act ". Due to the lack of national
regulation, states, and townships have stepped in to regulate unconventional gas pro-
duction. However there are substantial regional variations in regulation: while some
states and townships have responded to citizens' concerns by placing bans or tem-
poral ordinances on fracking, others have aimed at providing a favorable business
environment for the energy industry and explicitly welcomed fracking.
As a consequence of local regulation and land{use laws, large parts of shale basins
are currently inaccessible to industry (Blohm et al., 2012). If the current levels of
natural gas production are to be maintained, the rapid decline in well productivity
requires constant expansion to new areas (Hughes, 2013). In case of the predictions
of the EIA (2014), which suggest a further increase of unconventional gas drilling
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until 2040, the spatial expansion has to be even stronger. This puts great pressure
on more strict state and local regulators. At the same time, the latter are receiving
increasing support from concerned citizens, politicians, and academic scholars, as the
rst environmental and public health damages are documented.
A neglected area of research in this eld is the analysis of socio{demographic corre-
lates of unconventional gas wells, and the question of whether the strong regional vari-
ations in fracking regulations have led to environmental inequality by socio{economic
status. In the U.S., many studies have emphasized the unequal distribution of envi-
ronmental quality by socio-demographics (Anderton et al., 1994; Banzhaf and Walsh,
2008; Mohai and Saha, 2006; Pastor et al., 2005; Zwickl et al., 2014). According
to measures of environmental inequality, such as the environmental Gini coecient,
environmental quality is much more unequally distributed across the population than
income inequality (Boyce et al., 2014). Since environmental disparities have been
found to increase socio-economic health disparities (Currie, 2011; Neidell, 2004) and
educational disparities (Currie et al., 2009; Mohai et al., 2011; Pastor et al., 2004), a
reduction of environmental inequality has become a major policy target for U.S. en-
vironmental regulatory authorities such as the Environmental Protection Agency. A
planned EPA fracking study aims at including some case{studies on fracking and en-
vironmental justice (EPA, 2012b). However, the scope of these case studies is limited,
and due to regional variations the ndings might not be generalizable to other regions.
So far there exists no study analyzing the socio-economic correlates of fracking at a
more aggregate level, making both inter{state and intra{state comparisons.
Using data on the geographic location of fracking wells from ve states { Texas,
Pennsylvania, Colorado, North Dakota, Oklahoma { with mandatory disclosure to the
FracFocus website, that I merged with the American Community Survey 2006-2010
and EPA's Smart Location Database at the blockgroup{level, I compare the socio-
economic characteristics of blockgroups in close proximity to at least one fracking
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well (within 1.5 or 5 kilometers of a well) with blockgroups in counties with fracking
activity, but no fracking in their immediate vicinity. The exclusion of blockgroups in
counties without fracking activity reduces the possibility that the observed dierences
are due to geological properties, as opposed to variation in environmental regulations
and land{use laws: Since gas shales span wide contiguous areas (e.g. the Marcellus
shale covers 70% of Pennsylvania and most of West Virginia), within{county vari-
ations in shale reserves are typically very low, and thus the blockgroups included
are likely to share similar potential for unconventional gas drilling.2 The selection of
these ve states is due to data availability, since these states have passed hydraulic
fracturing disclosure laws to the FracFocus website. However, a comparison among
these states is also interesting, because of their dierent regulatory frameworks and
histories. Of the ve States, Texas has the longest history in both conventional and
unconventional natural gas drilling. However, it is equally known for its lax envi-
ronmental regulations, and its repeated conict with EPA over the enforcement of
the Clean Air Act (Rahm, 2011). Pennsylvania, by contrast, has less tradition in
natural gas production, and is currently struggling in regulating the rapidly grow-
ing energy industry. The ve states also have very dierent environmental justice
policies: Whereas Oklahoma and North Dakota have made no specic environmen-
tal justice attempts, Colorado and Texas have aimed at incorporating environmental
justice considerations into existing programs. Of the ve states, Pennsylvania is the
only one with an environmental justice working group, advisory board, environmental
justice conferences and community participation platforms (Bonorris, 2010).
I nd evidence for signicant environmental disparities by race/ethnicity and
educational levels between block{groups with and without fracking. These dier-
2Moreover, since the boundaries of estimated shale reserves are constantly changing, it is unlikely
that alternative ways of omitting blockgroups without shale reserves, e.g. by using GIS layers of
shale basins or plays, will yield more precise results.
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ences are stronger when only urban blockgroups are included. However, there are
strong between{state and between{county variations in these patterns. The re-
sults are driven by Oklahoma and North Dakota, where environmental disparities
by race/ethnicity are especially strong. Analyzing high{density fracking, I also nd
consistent increases in environmental disparities with increased numbers of wells.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of current
academic debates on the costs and benets of unconventional gas drilling, fracking
regulation and the spatial distribution of fracking in the U.S. Section 3 describes data
and methodology, section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes.
3.3 Literature Review
Amidst the rapid expansion of unconventional gas drilling, its costs and benets
are still poorly understood. Only recently, the number of academic studies on this
issue has increased sharply and has altered the perception of the costs and benets:
while there is increasing evidence that the benets were over{estimated, the long{run
environmental and human health costs could be seriously under{estimated.
3.3.1 Economic, environmental and human health eects
A recent prominent study has emphasized the drop in natural gas prices, a reduc-
tion of U.S. energy imports, and a substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels
as a result of the shale gas boom (Moniz et al., 2011). Internationally, 2/3 of con-
ventional natural gas reserves lie in Russia and the Middle East (Rogers, 2011). In
the U.S., \conventional" natural gas production has been declining since the 1990s,
and will further decline until 2040 according to EIA (2014) predictions. The sharp
increase in natural gas production (gure C.1) is mainly due to the massive expansion
of shale gas, and to a lesser extent tight gas and coalbed methane. While shale gas
contributed to less than 5 percent of total natural gas production in 2005, it has in-
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creased to almost 40 percent in 2012 and is predicted to contribute to over 50 percent
of total natural gas production by 2033 (see gure C.1).
[Insert gure C.1 about here]
Since natural gas burns cleaner and more eciently than coal, it has been labeled
a \bridging" or \transition" fuel, even in important climate-change reports3. The
underlying assumption is that the replacement of coal by natural gas will gradually
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time enabling a smooth transition
towards a low-carbon economy. However, recent academic studies have challenged this
view for being over{optimistic, arguing that the overall greenhouse gas footprint of
unconventional natural gas is much higher. The greenhouse gas footprint of uncon-
ventional natural gas includes not only the \direct emissions of CO2 from end{use
consumption", but also \indirect emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels used to extract,
develop and transport gas, and methane fugitive emissions and venting." (Howarth
et al., 2011, p. 2). While Santoro et al. (2011) nd the indirect eects relatively
small compared to the direct eects, methane leakages are a big concern. Methane,
the major component of natural gas, is a potent greenhouse gas. Using a time horizon
of 20 years4, Howarth et al. (2011) nd { even with their low estimates of fugitive
emissions { that shale gas has a bigger greenhouse gas footprint than conventional
gas, coal and diesel oil. For a 100{year time horizon, the greenhouse gas footprints
of shale gas, coal and diesel oil are roughly equal. Unsurprisingly, their study has
received wide attention and has been criticized on the grounds of using too high aver-
age fugitive methane emissions of 3.6-7.9% (O'Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012). These are
3See for example the section \Natural gas as a potential `bridge' to low{carbon systems" in the
report by The New Climate Economy (2014).
4Compared to CO2, the residence time in the atmosphere of methane is shorter, so the overall
climate change eects have to be compared for a specic time horizon.
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substantially higher than previous estimates, but a series of recent analyses, includ-
ing a study by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2014), conrmed that
methane emissions from shale gas have been seriously underestimated.5
The shale gas boom could also increase overall energy consumption (Newell and
Raimi, 2014; McJeon et al., 2014). Using integrated assessment models of energy{
economy{climate systems, McJeon et al. (2014) simulate the eects of an abundant
natural gas scenario. Besides the substitution eect of coal for gas, which is the
underlying assumption in the \transition fuel" hypothesis, they nd a substantial scale
eect: \lower natural gas prices accelerate economic activity, reduce the incentive to
invest in energy{saving technologies, and lead to an aggregate expansion of the total
energy system." (McJeon et al., 2014, p. 2). Both Newell and Raimi (2014) and
McJeon et al. (2014) emphasize that natural gas will not reduce global greenhouse
gas emissions in the absence of climate change mitigation policy.
At the local level, unconventional gas drilling has become a hope for impoverished
townships and rural communities. Analyzing the employment and income eects of
the shale gas boom in Colorado, Texas and Wyoming, Weber (2012) estimates that
each million dollars in gas production will create 2.35 additional jobs in the county of
production. Several industry studies assume that 95% of direct spending by industry
and royalty payments take place within the state and therefore emphasize the high
local benets, but Kinnaman (2011) criticizes that this number has no empirical
basis. According to estimates by the Allegheny Conference, 70 percent of the workers
operating unconventional gas wells in Pennsylvania have been from out-of-state6. The
reason for this is that most of these jobs require special skills, and it is infeasible to
train new workers only for the short period of the local fracking boom (Apple, 2014).
5See also Tollefson (2012) for a discussion, and Stephenson et al. (2012) for a case-study of the
greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas in British Columbia.
6Allegheny Conference: 70 Percent Of Marcellus Shale Workers From Out-Of-State http://
paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.co.at/2010/07/allegheny-conference-70-percent-of.html
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Increased incomes through royalty payments are considered another positive local
impact. Royalty payments can be on a per{acre or per{well basis and are negotiated
privately between rms and mineral rights owners. In Wyoming, a company that
operates over 140 wells pays average annual royalty payments of around $1,300 per
well during the duration of production (Lipscomb et al., 2012). Since these are private
contracts, it is unclear how representative this number is for other cases. Moreover,
since the performance and life{span varies strongly between wells (Jacoby et al.,
2012) there is a substantial uncertainty over the length of the royalty payment. If the
duration of production is short, and the environmental damages are high and lead
to property losses, then the royalty payments are likely oset by subsequent house
price declines. Both Muehlenbachs et al. (2012) and Lipscomb et al. (2012) nd that
hydraulic fracturing can have negative real estate valuation impacts, especially for
groundwater{dependent homes.
Furthermore, while the energy industry advocates the long{term local economic
benets of unconventional gas drilling by suggesting lifetimes of wells 40 years, Hughes
(2013) estimates that the output of an average US well drops by 80{95% within the
rst three years. Muehlenbachs et al. (2012) discuss how the widely acknowledged
\boom town" phenomenon could also apply to unconventional natural gas drilling: At
rst, local areas with shale gas production have increases in population, employment,
business activity and tax revenues. During the boom, local public goods, such as
infrastructure, are also expanded. However, when the gas reserves are declining and
industry relocates to new areas, the boom can be followed by bust (Muehlenbachs
et al., 2012).
The environmental consequences of fracking are even more contested then the local
economic eects. Due to missing national chemical disclosure laws, and { where they
exist { incomplete state-level disclosure laws because some chemicals can be declared
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as \trade secrets", little is known about the actual hydraulic fracturing uids.7 The
chemicals added to the uid mainly serve as friction reducers, scale inhibitors and
biocides, and depend amongst other factors on the geological properties (Vidic et al.,
2013). According to a MIT scholar, who is also on the Board of Directors of two energy
corporations, some of the toxic chemicals used \may be unnecessary (e.g. diesel oil)
or can be replaced at low cost with less toxic chemicals" (Joskow, 2013, p. 342).
Nevertheless, many of these chemicals are still in use. A report by the United States
House of Representatives found that between 2005-2009, 750 chemicals and other
components were used in hydraulic fracturing uids, ranging from relatively harmless
substances such as salt or citric acid, to extremely toxic ones, such as benzene or lead.
All in all, 29 extremely hazardous substances were identied in the report, as well as
many substances with unknown human and environmental toxicity (Waxman et al.,
2011). Another report identied a list of 632 distinct chemicals. For roughly half
of these chemicals CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service) numbers and thus estimates
about the relative toxicity exist; 25% of these are carcinogens, and 75% could have
some other adverse human health eects (Colborn et al., 2011). There is evidence
that spills with fracking \waste-water"8 are frequent, massively under{reported, and
not inspected in a timely fashion. For example, in Texas 30% of spills were inspected
only with long delays or not at all (Maule et al., 2013).
Another environmental hazard is a faulty seal of the well pad that does not pre-
vent gas migration into shallow groundwater. Vidic et al. (2013) nd faulty seals in
7There is currently a debate whether doctors treating patients showing symptoms of exposure to
toxic chemicals have the right to know the entire ingredient list, and whether they have to preserve
the secret even when other residents are potentially also threatened by exposure, see Thompson
(2012).
8After the hydraulic fracturing uid is injected under high pressure, a part of the uid returns
directly to the surface as \owback water". Another part of the uid is returning to the surface
during the production along with the gas, which is referred to as \produced water". Both are
considered \waste-water", and they can contain not only the chemicals used for the fracturing uid,
but additional radioactive material. The remaining part stays underground and very little is known
to date about its fate and transport.
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3.4% of wells in Pennsylvania, which is substantially higher than previous ndings.
Comparing ground water drinking wells in upstate New York, Osborn et al. (2011)
nd higher methane concentrations in the drinking water within one kilometer of a
fracking well, compared to areas with similar geological properties but no fracking
activity within that radius. The study has sparked substantial controversy, and was
criticised mainly on the ground that it does not control for pre-drilling methane con-
centrations in drinking water, that could also partly explain the higher concentrations
(for the debate see Davies, 2011, Schon, 2011 and Jackson et al., 2011). A third envi-
ronmental hazard is increased local air pollution due to the release of CH4, C02 and
other volatile organic chemicals that cause high levels of ozone and worse overall air
quality (Kargbo et al., 2010).
Even though there exists numerous anecdotal reports of respiratory, neurological
and other adverse human health impacts related to fracking activity, currently no
well-designed epidemiological study has been able to prove and quantify the dam-
age (Finkel and Law, 2011; Finkel and Hays, 2013). However, rst evidence from
quasi-experiments with farm animals suggest that human health impacts could be
substantial. Bamberger and Oswald (2012) interview farmers who split their herds
between pastures in various distances to fracking activity and nd that animal health
declines with proximity to fracking. However, their study has been criticized method-
ologically for to the small sample size, the survey methodology, and for not ruling out
the possiblity that variations in environmental quality unrelated to fracking explain
the dierences (Tollefson, 2012).
The criticisms of the research designs of both Osborn et al. (2011) and Bam-
berger and Oswald (2012) suggest that future studies should control for pre{drilling
environmental quality and human health to be able to prove the damage from frack-
ing. However, this requires the knowledge and resources to conduct studies before
fracking activity starts, and suggests that a case could be made for a slowdown in
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the expansion of drilling until the environmental and health consequences are better
understood, in lines with the precautionary principle (Goldstein, 2001).
The public concern for environmental and human health damages of fracking has
led to the creation of government advisory committees to further investigate this issue.
However, Goldstein et al. (2012) emphasize that the large majority of the members
of these commissions have neither a background in academic research, nor expertise
in environmental conservation or human health. For example, in the Pennsylvania
Governor's Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, only one out of 31 members has a
university aliation, and not a single member has demonstrated academic or profes-
sional expertise in ecosystem conservation or human health (Goldstein et al., 2012).
3.3.2 Regulation and Regulatory Failure
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, fracking was exempted from the main national
environmental laws, which otherwise put the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
in charge of regulating environmental quality. As a consequence, there are currently
no national standards or mandatory disclosure requirements for fracking. The De-
partment of Interior Bureau of Land Management, in charge of controlling all federal
and public lands, has welcomed unconventional gas drilling on federal land (Maule
et al., 2013).
In the absence of national standards, Apple (2014) outlines three layers of frack-
ing regulations: First, private rights, especially mineral rights, regulate how property
owners can sell their rights to exploit natural resources within their property's bound-
aries to an energy company, and how they are compensated through royalty payments.
In contrast to most countries, where governments generally hold the mineral rights,
in the U.S. historically the mineral rights were granted to the surface right owners.
When drilling and mining began, mineral rights and surface rights were often trans-
ferred separately, resulting in dierent combinations of property rights (King, nd) .
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Under \fee simple estate" all property rights belong to the same owner, under \split
estates" property rights are split between two or more parties (individuals, compa-
nies and the federal government). Two dierent forms of split estates are \fractional"
and \severed ownership" where the former refers to the situation where the surface
right owner owns part of the mineral right, whereas in the latter the two rights are
fully separated (Wittmeyer, 2013). Generally, states with a tradition in drilling and
mining have more split estates. Moreover, there are substantial variations in the re-
lationship between mineral rights and surface rights across states. In Texas, where
mineral rights supersede surface property rights, mineral rights owners can \use as
much surface land as is reasonably necessary to explore, drill, and extract minerals"
(Rahm, 2011, p. 2979). This includes the clearing of trees, removal of fences and
the building of pipelines. Furthermore, the mineral right owner does not have to
compensate the surface right owner for damages to the land. In other states, mineral
right owners are more restricted and have to ask surface property right holders for
permissions in many of the above examples.
Second, a regulatory overlay { largely at the state level { sets environmental and
health standards for drilling, and thus the conditions under which oil and gas com-
panies can realize their mineral rights. This regulatory overlay can include disclosure
laws of the chemicals used, worker safety laws, a ban of certain chemicals, up to a
ban or temporal ordinance to any fracking activity.
Third, local government laws regulate land use, access to local environmental
resources and infrastructure, as well as local tax rates for oil and gas companies.
These local variations can be strong, even within counties. Comparing regulations in
municipalities in Denton County, Texas, Fry (2013) nds strong variations in required
setback distances9 ranging from 91 to 457 meters. In Pennsylvania and Colorado,
9Minimum distances between residential locations and unconventional gas drilling in urban areas
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some local governments have put bans or ordinances on fracking, however there has
been much controversy about their legal authority to do so (for a more detailed
discussion see below).
Besides these three layers, Blohm et al. (2012) additionally mention the role of
regional administrative institutions responsible for specic environmental resources.
For example, the Delaware and the Susquehanna River Basin Commissions are in
charge of regulating water supply and withdrawal. Since hydraulic fracturing requires
large volumes of water, these commissions have signicant regulatory authority.
Why does regulation fail such that fracking companies can impose high external-
ities? At the national and state level insucient regulatory overlay can be explained
by \regulatory capture". According to the regulatory capture hypothesis, industry
can aect regulatory decisions by providing positive incentives to regulators, such
as bribes, campaign contributions, promise of future employment in the industry, or
negative incentives, such as threats to harm the regulators reputation. While the
original argument was developed by Stigler (1971) for the regulation of natural mo-
nopolies, a broader interpretation understands regulatory capture as \the process
through which special interests aect state interventions in any of its forms, which
can include areas as diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary
policy, or the legislation aecting R&D." (Dal Bo, 2006, p. 203). Laont and Tirole
(1991) develop a more complex regulatory capture model by including information
asymmetries and multiple agents, including environmentalists. They nd that due to
information asymmetries between rms and the regulators, interest groups have more
inuence when aiming at inecient regulation versus ecient regulation. Laont and
Tirole (1991) also show that organizing costs are important, and that these are lower
for rms than for consumers, because the latter are more decentralized.
There is multiple evidence of regulatory capture in the oil and gas industry in
the last decades. In 2011, the New York Times published interviews with two former
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EPA researchers who had conducted studies on the environmental impacts of the oil
and gas industry, and released many condential documents of EPA sta members in
the process of generating these studies. The rst study dates back to the 1980s, when
Congress asked EPA to conduct a study to analyze the environmental consequences of
wastes from oil and gas drilling. While the study found serious environmental hazards
and recommended tighter controls, but after pressure from the Oce of Legal Counsel
of the White House under Ronald Reagan, substantial parts of the ndings and policy
recommendations were removed (Urbina, 2011). More recently, in 2004, EPA released
a study arguing that hydraulic fracturing does not threaten drinking water quality and
should not be further investigated: \Based on the information collected and reviewed,
EPA has concluded that the injection of hydraulic fracturing uids into CBM [coalbed
methane] wells poses little or no threat to USDWs [underground sources of drinking
water] and does not justify additional study at this time." (EPA, 2004, emphases
added). However, according to the author and whistle{blower Weston Wilson, the
original nding was that there is \possible evidence" for aquifer contamination and
the intention of the study was to warn of further potential damages and put greater
regulations on industry (Urbina, 2011).
One year after the EPA study, George W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of
2005, which excluded hydraulic fracturing from the \Safe Water Drinking Act", the
\Clean Air Act", the \Superfund Law", the \Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act" and many other national environmental laws. Vice President
Dick Cheney was the chairman of the Energy Policy Task Force, in charge of preparing
the Energy Policy Act. Since Cheney also was former CEO of Halliburton, one of
the largest oil and gas drilling companies, the Energy Policy Act recieved the label
\Halliburton loophole". Later documents showed that executives from other oil and
gas industries also participated in the Task Force (Rahm, 2011).
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The Environmental Protection Agency is currently conducting a new study to
assess the environmental risks of fracking (EPA, 2011, 2012b). The EPA documents
published by the New York Times suggest that this study is also heavily inuenced
by industry interests: the agency dropped plans to analyze radioactivity in fracking
waste-water, and Congress members from drilling states have urged EPA to keep its
focus narrow (Urbina, 2011).
Examples of regulatory capture are, of course, not limited to the national level.10
However, it is plausible that regulatory capture declines with decentralization due to
organizing costs and information asymmetries: For industry, it might be easier and
more predictable to inuence one federal government or a few State governments as
opposed to hundreds of local townships. At the same time, information asymmetries
could decline with decentralization, since it is easier for a township than for a state
to notice and react to local environmental damages.
At the individual and local government levels, environmental pollution externali-
ties from \unconventional" natural gas drilling can be considered an outcome of co-
ordination failure, where current regulations intensify this coordination failure. The
widely acknowledged collective action problem in selling mineral rights to companies
is even stronger for fracking than for conventional natural gas. For conventional nat-
ural gas, the collective action problem mainly arises from three aspects: rst, that
companies can bargain with separate households over the transfer of the mineral right;
second, there are pollution externalities across property boundaries; and third, legal
regulations prohibit the drilling of too many wells within a short distance, to reduce
the environmental damages (Holahan and Arnold, 2013). Consequently, a property
10E.g. there is evidence that in Oklahoma both Republicans and Democrats are `captured' by in-
dustry: Republican Senators Tom Coburn and James M. Inhofe pressure EPA to limit their research
on the environmental consequences of fracking, while being among the Senate's top recipients of oil
and gas campaign contributions (Urbina, 2011). Democrat Dan Boren not only receives campaign
money from industry, but also benets from revenues from over 300 mineral leases from two of his
family businesses (Lipton, 2011).
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owner who does not agree to sell his or her mineral rights might still be exposed to a
signicant amount of pollution without receiving a royalty payment from the drilling
activity on the neighboring property. Therefore, in the absence of binding agreements
(such as laws to pool mineral rights) each property right holder has an incentive to
sell his or her rights to the company rst. Knowing this, the companies are in a
favorable bargaining position.
For unconventional natural gas drilling, the collective action problem is intensi-
ed by the fact that according to a court decision, the mineral rights only have to
be obtained for the vertical well, and not for subterranean trespassing for the hori-
zontal well (for a discussion see Apple, 2014). Since wells can extend up to 10,000
feet horizontally (Zoback et al., 2010), and thus frequently cross property bound-
aries, the collective action problem is intensied by the fact that it is not possible to
exclude fracking below the property if the neighbor sold his or her permit. Further-
more, since the environmental consequences of unconventional gas drilling are likely
to spread broader across space, the externalities are potentially much higher, which
also intensies the coordination failure compared to conventional natural gas.
At the local government level, Apple (2014) outlines another coordination failure
that particularly disadvantages poor rural communities: the competition of munici-
palities over incomes and taxes. Many low{income municipalities in rural areas with
declining populations have declining tax revenues, whereas suburban municipalities
can attract new high-income earners and increase tax revenues. As it becomes in-
creasingly dicult for the rural municipalities to nance local public infrastructure,
they often see the development of oil and gas as their last option. Due to their lack
of other options, of which the oil and gas companies are aware, poor rural commu-
nities have a less favorable bargaining position. This goes in line with the informal
regulation hypothesis, suggesting that community characteristics aect facility siting
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and local environmental regulation (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Pargal et al., 1997;
Zwickl and Moser, 2014).
Figure C.2 summarizes the multi{level regulation and regulatory failure of uncon-
ventional natural gas drilling. There is evidence that regulatory capture increases
with centralization, whereas coordination failures increase with decentralization of
regulation. This is one possible explanation as to why most regulation may take
place at intermediate levels.
[Insert gure C.2 about here]
Spence (2012) discusses an additional reason why regulation has \lagged behind
the industry's growth" (p. 53): The benets of the shale gas boom are experienced at
a dierent scale from the costs. While the federal government and the states benet
from severance tax revenues (taxes on mineral extraction) and royalty payments from
mineral rights on publicly owned land, most negative aspects of the shale gas boom
are experienced locally. While some local governments in dierent states have ad-
dressed the residents' environmental concerns by issuing more stringent local zoning
regulation, distance ordinances, or even temporal ordinances and bans on the entire
industry11, many states have been quick to react and sue the local governments to
overrule local zoning laws.
The probably most well{known legal dispute, that lasted over three years, is
\Robinson Township et al. v. Commonwealth". In 2010 Robinson Township, as
well as several other townships in Pennsylvania, passed local ordinances to partially
ban unconventional gas drilling and waste{water disposal within the township bor-
ders. In 2012 the State of Pennsylvania issued an amendment to the Pennsylvania
11 For an overview of local actions against fracking, see http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/
water/fracking/anti-fracking-map/local-action-documents/
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Oil and Gas Act (Act 13 of 2012), that would implement uniform land use regimes
for oil and gas development across the state, and hereby overrule the local land use
ordinances. In December 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nally overthrew
parts of Act 13, making local zoning laws valid (for a detailed discussion of the legal
dispute see Apple, 2014; for a similar legal conict over local zoning in Colorado see
Minor, 2014).
While in the above examples dierent regulatory authorities came into conict
due to overlaps concerning land{use regulation, in other cases these overlaps are used
for free{riding on the regulatory responsibility of other institutions (which might
again be related to regulatory capture). An example is the delegation of regulatory
authority by the Susquehanna River Basin Commission to the State of Pennsylvania:
While the Commission would have the \ability to regulate the injection of water
used in the hydraulic fracturing process as a consumptive use" (Blohm et al., 2012,
p.361) and would therefore have the authority to put a temporal ban on fracking to
conserve water quality, it delegates the responsibility of regulating water for shale
gas extraction to the states. By contrary, the Delaware River Basin Commission
made use of its authority and put a moratorium on natural gas drilling in 2011 until
new water protection regulations were passed (Blohm et al., 2012). All in all, these
regulatory dierences are likely to explain a substantial part of the spatial variation in
unconventional natural gas drilling, within areas where shale gas could be recovered.
3.3.3 The Geography of Unconventional Natural Gas Drilling
According to a report by the EIA (2013), the United States has the second largest
shale oil reserves following Russia, and the fourth largest shale gas reserves follow-
ing China, Argentina and Algeria. Figure C.3 shows shale basins and plays and for
the US, where the former are areas where shale deposits are likely, and the latter
are known to contain carbon-rich shale deposits. However, the amount of recoverable
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shale oil or gas varies strongly spatially even within shale plays. Compared to conven-
tional gas, which is located in discrete elds, gas shales span wider areas, although at
a given location the recovery factors may be low (Seto, 2011). Whether it is econom-
ically feasible to extract shale oil or shale gas in so far undeveloped areas will depend
on various additional factors, including the technology, access to natural sources and
sinks, and regulation. Therefore, estimates about the total recoverable shale gas and
oil in the US, and predictions on the geographical extension of unconventional gas
drilling, are subject to high uncertainty.
[Insert gure C.3 about here]
Figure C.4 shows the monthly production of shale gas from 2000{mid 2013 for
the eight largest shale gas plays: unconventional natural gas drilling took o very
recently and increased over vefold between the mid{2000s and 2013. While some
shales, such as the Barnett Shale in Texas, have been the rst to experience the shale
gas boom and now have stable production rates, the Marcellus Shale that underlies
large parts of Pennsylvania and West Virginia is still experiencing a rapid expansion
in production.
[Insert gure C.4 about here]
Figure C.5 shows the number of fracking wells by state between 2000 and February
2014. All in all, over one million wells have been drilled in the U.S. Over 300,000 of
these wells are in Texas alone, followed by over 100,000 each in Kansas and Pennsyl-
vania and around 84,000 in Colorado. Fifteen states, so far, have no unconventional
oil or gas wells, because they either have no discovered shale deposits or because they
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have put a ban on hydraulic fracturing, or both.
[Insert gure C.5 about here]
In these data, collected in a remarkable eort by FracTracker, the exact location of
wells is not known for Texas. Furthermore, the data quality may vary between states,
since data were obtained from dierent sources. I will use data from a single-source,
the FracFocus registry, for ve states with mandatory disclosure of new wells to the
registry. In these ve states, over half of total wells in the country have been drilled.
According to Hughes (2013), 70% of shale gas comes from elds with constant or
declining productivity. Without new drilling, total eld production falls between 30%
and 50% annually. The shale gas boom thus relies on rapid geographic expansion.
This requires changes in regulations, land use laws, and property rights. Under
current regulations large parts of the current shale reserves are inaccessible (Blohm
et al., 2012). An expansion of the shale gas boom will put pressure on more stringent
regulators, on the one hand. On the other hand, growing environmental and public
health concerns could increase the bargaining power of strong regulators. Thus, the
struggle about regulation, land use, and access to mineral rights is likely to increase
in the coming years. While U.S. consumers benet from the shale gas boom through
lower energy prices, who bears the costs? Against that background, an analysis of
the socio-demographic correlates of fracking activity is of great interest.
3.4 Data and Methodology
FracFocus Data
FracFocus is the biggest and only publicly accessible hydraulic fracturing chemi-
cal registry. It was founded in 2011 by the Groundwater Protection Council and the
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, initially as a voluntary chemical disclo-
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sure registry for owners, operators or service companies of fracking wells. In recent
years more and more states have passed fracking chemical disclosure laws, but the
disclosure requirements vary widely (for a list of chemical disclosure requirements by
state, see Murrill and Vann, 2012). Whereas in some states the reporting companies
have to make the information publicly accessible, in others the chemicals only have
to be reported to state agencies. Of the states that require disclosure to the public,
some states give companies the option to either report to FracFocus or to make the
information publicly accessible otherwise (Murrill and Vann, 2012). The low num-
ber of observations in some of these states suggests that many companies actually
don't report to FracFocus. In ve states (Colorado, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Oklahoma, and Texas) it has been made mandatory to report hydraulically fractured
wells to FracFocus. The current analysis is for these ve states. More than 40,000
of approximately 52,000 wells included in FracFocus in fall 2013 are located in these
states, over 23,000 of them in Texas alone. In the ve states, the wells reported to
FracFocus are located in 279 distinct counties (25 in Colorado, 12 in North Dakota,
47 in Oklahoma, 36 in Pennsylvania and 169 in Texas); see table C.1.
[Insert table C.1 about here]
While FracFocus has promised to provide detailed information on fracking chem-
icals to the public, it has been subject to criticism for not meeting that target. Kon-
schnik et al. (2013) emphasize three shortcomings of the data. First, there are prob-
lems with the timing of disclosure. Due to a lack of collaboration between FracFocus
and the states, the reporting companies can delay disclosure substantially. Since
many states have laws that already allow disclosure within 60 days after fracturing,
a considerable timespan can pass until a well site is registered. As a consequence,
communities often learn about the chemicals used well after they have been exposed
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to them for a while. Second, the substance of disclosures might not be captured cor-
rectly, because the submissions of reporting companies are not reviewed by FracFocus
before publishing. As a consequence, rms have no incentives to report carefully.
When downloading and comparing individual well{les, a wide variety in precision
and quality of the reports can be observed. The third and biggest point of criticism
is that under current laws rms can easily avoid full disclosure by declaring some of
their chemicals as trade{secret. Since most states have exceptions for trade secrets,
and FracFocus doesn't provide any rules on this, it remains largely in the discretion
of the reporting rms which chemicals are not disclosed (Konschnik et al., 2013).
While it would be very interesting to analyze the chemicals used in fracking from
an environmental inequality perspective, due to these data shortcomings the present
analysis is limited to the location of the wells, for which the data should be more
reliable.
The FracFocus data are not available in aggregate form for scientic purposes on
the disclosure website12, but instead as separate PDF les for every company. The
organization \Skytruth" webscraped the data and published the geo{coded well{data
on their website13 from 2011{2013. Due to a change in the database organization,
their webscraping technique was no longer possible after 2013. Our sample thus
includes wells registered between 2011 and 2013, obtained from Skytruth.
Neighborhood-Level Data
To explore the socio{demographic correlates of fracking wells, I merge the geo{
coded fracking data with the American Community Survey 2006-2010 ve-year es-
timates and EPA's Smart Location Database. The American Community Survey is
a continuous survey that is conducted yearly, based on which 1{year, 3{year and
12http://fracfocus.org/
13http://frack.skytruth.org/fracking-chemical-database/frack-chemical-data-download
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5{year averages are estimated, where the latter are considered most reliable for
ne geographic resolutions such as blockgroups. I include blockgroup variables on
race/ethicity (percent non-Hispanic whites, percent African Americans, percent His-
panics of all blockgroup residents), educational attainment (percent without a high
school degree and percent with a bachelor degree or higher), income and poverty (per-
cent poor, median income, percent above an annual household income of $100,000,
and percent below an annual household income of $50,000), and variables on the
percent of vacant and rented housing units (for a list of variables and blockgroup
averages for the sample, see table C.2).
From EPA's Smart Location Database I obtain blockgroup{level variables on the
percent of low{wage, medium{wage and high{wage workers by home and workplace
geography14, as well as several land use variables: residential density (housing units
per acre), employment density (jobs per acre), industrial employment density (indus-
trial jobs per acre), activity density (housing units and jobs per acre) and total road
network density. The Smart Locations Database was compiled by EPA using Census
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics 2010 data for earnings, and 2010 Census
data for most land{use variables.
Methodology
The data on the geographic locations of fracking wells were merged with the
blockgroup{level socio{demographic data by two dierent methods, both frequently
used in the empirical literature on environmental justice. The rst is the \unit-
hazard coincidence" method, where \[s]ociodemographic characteristics of spatial
units containing a hazard (host units) are compared with those that do not contain
such hazards (nonhost units) to determine disproportionate proximity or exposure"
14Low wage workers are dened to have monthly earnings of $1250 or less, medium wage workers
earn between $1250 and $3333, and high wage workers earn more than $3333 per month.
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(Chakraborty et al., 2011; see also Mohai and Saha, 2006). In this analysis, the census
block of each geo{coded well was determined and the number of wells by blockgroup
was calculated15.
The second method is \distance-based analysis", which typically draws buers
around each (potential) environmental hazard and compares the socio{economic char-
acteristics of spatial units falling within the buer to those outside (Chakraborty
et al., 2011). Using Stata's package \geonear", I calculated the distance from each
population{weighted blockgroup centroid to the nearest fracking well, and generated
dummy variables for all blockgroups within 20km, 10km, 5km, and 1.5km of at least
one fracking well. While the interest lies in the 1.5km and 5km buers, the broader
buers were included for robustness and consistency checks.
Figures C.6 and gure C.7 illustrates the dierent merging methods, where the
data are aggregated to the county-level: Figure C.6 shows the average number of
wells by blockgroup across counties, and gure C.7 shows the average blockgroup's
distance to the closest well, also by county. Using both methods, we see similar clus-
ters of counties with high fracking.
[Insert gure C.6 and gure C.7 about here]
Both merging methods have advantages and disadvantages in capturing residen-
tial proximity to fracking. Due to considerable variations in blockgroup size16, in
15I thank Michael Ash and Don Blair for helping with this merging method by writing the Python
program https://github.com/dwblair/latlong2uscensus that uses the U.S. National Broadband
Map http://www.broadbandmap.gov/developer/api/census-api-by-coordinates to determine
the census blocks of specied U.S. coordinates.
16Blockgroups are geographical units created by the US Census Buero and typically include be-
tween 600 and 3000 people. Blockgroups are the smallest geographical unit for which the Census
and American Community Survey publish most income and socio{economic variables. All in all, the
US consists of over 200,000 blockgroups, the ve states in our sample consist of over 32,000 block-
groups. Due to variations in population density, blockgroups, like every other Census geographical
unit that is created to contain a certain number of residents, strongly vary in size. The administra-
88
some large blockgroups wells can be far from most residents and therefore pose less
human harm than wells in the immediate vicinity. These wells can be excluded using
the distance-based merging method. In small blockgroups, by contrary, wells can
aect residents in more than one blockgroup. Whereas the distance{based methods
accounts for this, the unit{coincidence method only counts the well to the blockgroup
in which it is located. For these reasons, I prefer the distance-based merging method.
However, the unit-coincidence method will be used to investigate high-density frack-
ing, by analyzing blockgroups with more than 50, 100 or 500 wells.
While the unit{coincidence and the distance-based analysis are methods to de-
ne the treatment group, an equally important methodological question is how to
dene the control group. For meaningful comparisons it is important to reduce un-
explained variation between the two. This study analyzes whether regulation and
land{use laws have led to a specic spatial distribution of fracking activity, which
causes socio{economic disparities in proximity to fracking. It is important to only
compare areas where fracking is geologically feasible. I therefore exclude all observa-
tions in counties with no fracking (specically counties with no fracking in at least one
blockgroup, and no fracking within at least 5 kilometers of one blockgroup's centroid).
Since shale reserves span large areas, it is reasonable to assume that blockgroups in
counties with any fracking activity share similar geographical properties. Figure C.8
graphically outlines the counties in the sample. For comparative purposes, I also
present the socio{demographics of counties with no fracking, and compare them to
those of the counties in the sample.
tive boundaries and the variation in blockgroup size raise the question to what extent blockgroups
represent neighborhoods. Moreover, by analyzing between{blockgroup variation in neighborhood
characteristics, we ignore within{blockgroup variation that could also be substantial. However, due
to data limitations we cannot empirically investigate these issues.
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[Insert gure C.8 about here]
Table C.2 shows summary statistics for the blockgroup characteristics for the en-
tire sample (blockgroups in counties with fracking, column 1), the dierent spatial
buers (column 2{5) and the blockgroups with fracking wells (column 6). We see, as
expected, that the sample size drops as the spatial radii decrease, along with the aver-
age distance to the nearest fracking well (from column 1{5). Comparing blockgroups
with wells (column 6) with the 1.5km buer (column 5), we see that the number of
blockgroups in both is similar. However, the average distance to the closest well in
blockgroups with fracking is substantially higher, and even higher compared to the
5km buer. The variation in socio{demographics between these two merging methods
also suggest that they include very dierent blockgroups to the \treatment group".
The biggest dierence is in population density, which is substantially lower in block-
groups with wells. The dierence can be explained by the fact that column 6 includes
many rural areas, where fracking may be far away from residents, with unclear and
eects on them. We are most interested in comparing socio-economic characteristics
of cases where fracking is likely to aect residents for which we will mainly use the
distance{based method.
[Insert table C.2 about here]
3.5 Results
In a rst step, characteristics of counties with and without fracking are compared
(see table C.3). As noted, these dierences are partly due to geological dierences,
but this comparison is included to provide some background for the within{county
disparities. On average, the percentage of non{Hispanic whites and Hispanics is sig-
nicantly higher in fracking counties, whereas the percentage of African Americans
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and other minorities is signicantly lower. Average income is lower, so are population
density, employment density and activity density. At a ner scale, comparing block-
groups with no fracking in their vicinity, but fracking in their county (column 4), with
blockgroups in close proximity to fracking (column 5), we see that the percentage of
non{Hispanic whites declines signicantly with proximity to fracking, whereas the
percentage of African Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities increases. Further-
more, education levels drop signicantly: whereas the percentage of people without
a high{school degree increases, the percentage of people with a bachelors degree or
higher falls. Income variables generate a more mixed picture: while there are no sta-
tistically signicant dierences in percent poor, median incomes, or top incomes, the
percentage of households with annual incomes below $50,000 drops slightly, as does
the percentage of low{wage workers by both residential and workplace geography.
The percentage of high{wage workers increases both by home and workplace geog-
raphy. There are no signicant dierences in the percent of housing that is vacant
or rented. However, there are strong drops in residential density, population density,
employment density, and road network density. All in all, this suggests that when the
ve states are pooled and both urban and rural neighborhoods are included, there
are disparities by race, ethnicity and education in proximity to fracking, but no clear
patterns with respect to neighborhood income.
[Insert table C.3 about here]
Table C.4 presents result for the subset of urban blockgroups. These comprise
80% of blockgroups in counties with at least one fracking well. In urban areas,
residential distance to fracking wells is generally lower, more people are potentially
aected, and variations in regulation are likely to matter even more for potential
human damage. An important regulatory tool in urban areas is the setback distance
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ordinance. These are largely not technically-based, but reect dierent political com-
promises (Fry, 2013). Socio{economic disparities in proximity to fracking therefore
could be substantially higher within the subset of urban blockgroups. In urban areas,
the percentage of whites is generally lower, and the population density variables are
higher, whereas income and education levels compare to those in the rural areas in
the dataset. Within counties with fracking, the percentage of Hispanics increases
from 10.4% to 13.8% in urban blockgroups and the percentage of African Americans
increases from 25.2% to 30.4%. The percentage of residents without a high school de-
gree increases, and the percentage with a university degree drops. All these changes
are signicant and stronger than in table C.3. However, as for the whole sample,
the income variables are not statistically dierent, and the wage variables suggest
that earnings in fracking areas are generally higher. Thus, all in all disparities by
race/ethnicity and education are stronger in urban areas, whereas income dierences
cannot be identied in either, for the ve states pooled.
[Insert table C.4 about here]
In the next step, table C.3 and table C.4 are replicated for the ve states sep-
arately. The ve states have very dierent histories and institutional landscapes,
reecting both dierences in socio{economic characteristics, and dierences in the
regulation of unconventional natural gas drilling. Table C.5 presents results for Col-
orado. In general, fracking counties and non{fracking counties have similar socio{
characteristics in Colorado. Within fracking counties, the percent of non{Hispanic
whites does not change with proximity to fracking, the percentage of African Ameri-
cans falls, and the percentage of Hispanics increases. Educational attainment declines,
but income and wages increase and poverty declines. All in all, there is no clear ev-
idence of environmental disparities by minority status or income in Colorado. The
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same holds true when analyzing the subset of urban areas in Colorado (see table C.6).
However, a comparison of within{county disparities for two large Colorado counties
{ Adams county and Boulder county { suggests that variation in the results between
counties could be substantial. In both counties the percentage of minorities is higher
than on average in Colorado, so are poverty rates, whereas median income and av-
erage educational attainment are lower. Whereas in Adams county the percentage
of whites increases with proximity to fracking17, in Boulder county the percentage of
whites drops, the percentages of both African Americans and Hispanics increase, and
average educational attainments fall.
[Insert table C.5, table C.6 and table C.7 about here]
North Dakota shows a very dierent picture than Colorado (table C.8): While
many variables are not statistically signicantly dierent, the percentage of Whites
signicantly drops from 91.5% to 75.6% with proximity to fracking in fracking coun-
ties. Since there is no statistically signicant dierence in the percent of Hispanics or
African Americans, this has to be due to an increase of other minorities, presumably
native Americans. Note, however, that the sample size in North Dakota is relatively
small. Because of the small sample size and because fracking in North Dakota pre-
dominantly takes place in rural areas, we do not report results for urban areas for
this state.
[Insert table C.8 about here]
17Where proximity in this table is dened using the 5km buer, since the number of observations
for the county-level comparison is are already low.
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In Oklahoma (table C.9), the most striking result is the strong increase in the per-
centage of African Americans, especially within counties, with increased proximity to
fracking, and along with it the drop in non{Hispanic whites. Furthermore, average
educational attainment declines, whereas poverty increases, and median household
income declines. When only including urban blockgroups, these disparities are even
stronger: the percentage of whites declines from 65.3% to 38.2%, whereas the per-
centage of African Americans increases from 11.0% to 49%. Average educational
attainment and median income also decline more strongly than in table C.9, whereas
poverty and the percentage of low wage workers increases more. All in all, socio{
economic disparities in proximity to fracking appear particularly acute in urban Ok-
lahoma.
[Insert table C.9 and table C.10 about here]
In Pennsylvania (table C.11), by contrast, the percentage of whites increases sig-
nicantly both between counties outside and inside the sample, as well as within
counties. The large majority (96.7%) of residents in proximity to fracking are white.
While there is no statistically signicant dierence in incomes within counties, there
are signicant declines in educational attainment. These patterns can generally be
conrmed for the subset of urban blockgroups, although fracking in Pennsylvania still
largely takes place in rural areas.
[Insert table C.11 and table C.12 about here]
In Texas (table C.13), the percentage of whites increases with proximity to frack-
ing, both between counties without and with fracking, and within counties between
blockgroups outside versus within the 1.5 buer. The percentage of Hispanics, by
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contrast declines. The percentage of people with university degree declines; however,
so does the percentage of poor residents. The percentage of rich households declines,
but otherwise there is no statistically signicant dierence in incomes. These pat-
terns generally are conrmed for the subset of urban blockgroups, where fracking is
widespread in Texas.
[Insert table C.13 and table C.14 about here]
Finally, results for high{density fracking are reported: blockgoups with at least
one well are compared to blockgroups with over 50, 100 and 500 wells. All in all,
we see that the percentage of whites decreases with the number of wells, whereas the
percentages of African Americans and Hispanics increase. The percentage without a
high school increases, whereas the percentage with a bachelors degree or higher falls.
While there are no clear eects of the income variables, all the population density
variables strongly decline with the number of wells.
[Insert table C.15 about here]
3.6 Conclusion
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study to analyze the socio{economic
correlates of proximity to hydraulic fracturing wells beyond case{study evidence. For
the ve states pooled, I nd evidence for signicant environmental disparities by
race/ethnicity and educational levels, but not by blockgroup average income. These
dierences are stronger when only urban blockgroups are included. The results are
driven by two states, Oklahoma and North Dakota, where environmental disparities
by race/ethnicity are especially strong. These are the states known for massive regula-
tory failure and non{existing state{level environmental justice laws. In Pennsylvania,
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by contrast, where state{level environmental justice eorts appear stronger, we do
not nd environmental injustice by minority status or income. Pennsylvania is part
of the Mid{Atlantic region (EPA region 3), which stood out in chapter 2 for being
the only region where whites face higher overall pollution burdens than minorities.
The results suggest that it is important to conduct further research on fracking and
environmental inequality, and to investigate the causes of environmental disparities by
socio{economic status in more detail, as well as the consequences of these disparities
for the socio{economic status health gap. The two states of particular concern are
Oklahoma and North Dakota. In Oklahoma, fracking in urban areas should be further
analyzed; in North Dakota, the consequences of fracking for native Americans should
be explored.
The question of who bears the costs of unconventional natural gas drilling is of
great relevance not only for the U.S. but worldwide. According to estimates by
Measham and Fleming (2014), around 300 million people across six continents in
populated areas live on land that overlies shale{energy reservoirs. As unconventional
gas drilling expands across the world, the regulation of unconventional natural gas
drilling, and especially hydraulic fracturing, in the U.S. may have an impact on its
regulation in other countries, and on the environmental and human health conse-
quences.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this dissertation has been to provide empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between economic inequality and environmental degradation. Using data
on environmental hazards and pollution exposure at very ne levels of geographic
resolution, I nd strong empirical evidence for disproportionate pollution burdens in
poor and minority neighborhoods, and thus that economic inequality manifests itself
in environmental inequality. I also nd that inequality does not only hurt those at the
bottom of the income distribution, but can negatively aect the entire community's
ability to collective action. If communities are less able to ght facility sitings or
impose stronger environmental regulations on rms in their neighborhood, this can
lead to higher levels of air pollution exposure. I also analyze a recent and currently
widely debated topic of environmental concern: the siting of fracking wells. Using
geocoded fracking well data for ve states with mandatory disclosure requirements, I
nd signicant disparities by race/ethnicity and educational attainment in proximity
to fracking.
Three methodological issues for further research in this eld concern the prop-
erties of geographic environmental micro{data and the research designs of empirical
environmental justice studies:
First, environmental justice studies should take spatial correlation more seriously.
The widely cited study by Bertrand et al. (2004) has emphasized the importance of
properly accounting for temporal autocorrelation in micro-econometric studies. By
analyzing the \eects" of placebo laws on female wages in dierence-in-dierence
studies, they found that research designs not properly controlling for autocorrelation
too often fail to reject the null hypothesis of no eect of the placebo-law. They
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conclude that existing studies on a wide range of empirical topics not accounting for
autocorrelation might be subject to a similar problem, thus report \eects" that are
only due to correlated data rather than actual consequences of a policy.
In studies with geographic micro-data, spatial autocorrelation of the data could
similarly lead to incorrect inference. Nevertheless, only very recently have environ-
mental justice studies started to be concerned about this econometric issue. Spatial
autocorrelation can manifest itself in three ways: it can be limited to the dependent
variable due to spill{overs, limited to the errors due to spatial scale eects, or it
can occur in both the dependent variable and the errors. Only when spatial auto-
correlation is limited to the error term, and thus the spatial structure is in no way
correlated with the explanatory variables, are the point estimates of the OLS spec-
ication unbiased, in which case only the standard errors have to be corrected. In
the other two cases the point estimates (additionally) can be biased. Furthermore,
as yet there is no detailed discussion about the choice of the spatial weight matrix
in environmental justice studies. However, the choice of the spatial weight matrix is
crucial, because the model can (still) be misspecied if the spatial structure is not
modeled correctly (Bivand et al., 2013). The few studies so far that have estimated
spatial environmental justice models at the census tract{level are limited to small
regions in relatively densely populated areas with small census tracts and have used
distance-based weights (see, for example Chakraborty, 2009). However, they oer
little guidance towards the choice of a spatial weight matrix for the whole US at the
census tract-level (with unequally sized tracts, and neighborless observations due to
missing observations in the data). In chapter 2 we have attempted to address some
of these issues, however this methodology should be further developed.
Second, environmental justice studies should consider how to improve the empir-
ical assessment of environmental disparities. When estimating pollution exposure as
a function of income, race/ethnicity, and \non-discriminatory" control variables, the
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coecients especially for race/ethnicity, but also the coecients for percent poor,
are almost always positive and signicant, and the results are very robust towards
dierent estimation strategies (OLS, spatial models), the inclusion of dierent control
variables, and various standard error corrections (clustered standard errors, HAC er-
rors). However, due to the strong spatial concentration of pollution exposure, much
of the variation in the dependent variable cannot be captured by the explanatory
variables, and thus even in specications with city xed-eects the overall t of the
models remain relatively low. One reason for this can be the strong spatial concen-
tration of the pollution data. While many tracts in the US have little or no industrial
air pollution, a small number of tracts have extraordinarily high levels. While many
of these highly polluted tracts have high shares of minorities, only a small share of
the tracts with high shares of minorities are highly polluted tracts. Future research
designs should consider whether there are better ways to assess environmental dis-
parities, taking these imbalances into account.
Third, future studies should focus on investigating causality concerning the mech-
anisms involved. Many environmental justice studies are mainly descriptive, without
asking whether the observed disparities are due to \siting" or \move in" (for discussion
see Chapters 1 and 2). Better understanding of the precise causes for environmen-
tal disparities is necessary to design policies to reduce environmental inequality. If
\move in" is dominant, this suggests that economic inequality is the problem, and
increasing the income prospects of poor households would mean that they could af-
ford to live in cleaner areas. Since \move in" could also be caused by housing{market
and credit{market discrimination, these measures should go along with stronger anti{
discrimination laws. If \siting" is strong, environmental degradation can be under-
stood as a mechanism that widens economic inequality by disproportionately placing
environmental hazards in already disadvantaged communities. Discriminatory \sit-
ing" can be reduced by stronger environmental regulations and the inclusion of equity
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considerations before siting new facilities. Analyses of causality in this eld are lim-
ited because most studies use large cross-sectional databases (with large n but no
t dimension). Moreover census geography at ner levels of geographic resolution is
endogenous (because census geography boundary changes respond to demographic
changes). The attempt of Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) to create articial communities
drawing circular buers can also be problematic, because these might not represent
actual communities. Research designs that address this problem and can establish
causality could advance this economically, socially and environmentally important
eld of research in the future.
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Table A.1. Summary Statistics (N=143,716 block groups) in urbanized areas
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75 p90
Exposure 4434 299 1281 4210 11435
ln(1+Exposure) 6.809 5.703 7.156 8.345 9.345
Median Income/100k 0.494 0.321 0.449 0.617 0.807
Percent White 62.7% 36.6% 75.1% 90.5% 95.9%
Percent African American 13.5% 0.4% 3.2% 12.8% 46.6%
Percent Hispanic 16.5% 1.5% 5.4% 18.8% 55.3%
Percent Other Minority 5.4% 0.5% 2.4% 6.1% 13.3%
Notes: Summary statistics are population-weighted block group av-
erages. Exposure is censored at the p97 value.
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Figure A.1. EPA Regions
1 New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
2 Northeast: New Jersey, New York (We exclude Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands which are also
part of this region)
3 Mid-Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia
4 Southeast: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee
5 Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin
6 South Central: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas
7 Central Plains: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska
8 Central Mountains: Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
9 West, Southwest and Hawaii: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada (We exclude Pacic Territories
which are also part of this region)
10 Pacic Northwest: Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington
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Figure A.2. Percent Shares in Income Strata by EPA Region
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1: below $10k;
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7: $75-100k;
8: above $100k.
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Figure A.3. Quintile Map of the percent of Clean Air Act active major sources
receiving full compliance evaluations by the state or EPA between 2008-2010
% of CAA active major sources recieving FCE
0.2800 - 0.8400
0.8400 - 0.9100
0.9100 - 0.9400
0.9400 - 0.9700
0.9700 - 1.0000
Note: EPA Echo Database
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Figure A.4. Quintile Map of weighted Median State Exposure in urbanized areas
Population Weighted Median State Exposure
0.0000 - 99.6340
99.6340 - 433.9494
433.9494 - 1031.3164
1031.3164 - 1866.1224
1866.1224 - 4409.0054
Note: Authors' calculations
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Figure A.5. Quintile Map of the ratio of Median Minority to Median White Expo-
sure in urbanized areas
average minority/white exposure
0.5026 - 1.0133
1.0133 - 1.2006
1.2006 - 1.3064
1.3064 - 1.6249
1.6249 - 3.3788
Note: Authors' calculations, Alaska, Hawaii and North Dakota have missing values
since median urbanized exposure was zero for at least one of the two groups.
Figure A.6. Quintile Map of the ratio of Median Poor to Non-poor Exposure in
urbanized areas
average Poor/Nonpoor exposure
0.5042 - 1.0022
1.0022 - 1.1002
1.1002 - 1.2691
1.2691 - 1.4940
1.4940 - 3.2949
Note: Authors' calculations, Alaska, Hawaii and North Dakota have missing values
since median urbanized exposure was zero for at least one of the two groups.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Table C.1. Number of wells by State, 2011-2013
State Number of Wells
Counties with at least one
well
Colorado 6,732 25
North Dakota 3,619 12
Oklahoma 2,685 47
Pennsylvania 5,296 36
Texas 23,295 169
5 States 41,627 279
Note: FracFocus Database
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Figure C.1. Conventional and unconventional natural gas production, 1990-2040
(trillion cubic feet)
Source: EIA (2014)
Figure C.2. Regulation and regulatory failure
Source: Own presentation
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Figure C.3. Shale basins and plays in the contiguous U.S.
Source: FracTracker 2014, http:
//maps.fractracker.org/latest/?webmap=b26c43968bf8435388cbd4b33f2c4b3d
Figure C.4. Shale gas production (dry shale gas in billion cubic feet/day)
Source: EIA 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/archive/2013/12_19/index.cfm
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Figure C.5. Oil and Gas Wells by State, 2000-February 2014
Source: FracTracker 2014,
http://www.fractracker.org/2014/03/1-million-wells/
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Figure C.6. Number of wells
Note: FracFocus Database, own calculations
Figure C.7. Average Distance to nearest well
Note: FracFocus Database, own calculations
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Figure C.8. Counties in Sample
Note: FracFocus Database, own calculations
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Table C.2. A comparison of both merging methods
Variable c=1 20km 10km 5km 1.5km well(s) in bg
km to closest well 12.4318 9.6833 4.8239 2.3952 0.9194 3.6467
% White 0.6316 0.6392 0.6446 0.6343 0.5832 0.7591
% African American 0.0922 0.0909 0.0780 0.0824 0.1126 0.0465
% Hispanic 0.2240 0.2173 0.2297 0.2385 0.2596 0.1553
% No Highschool 0.1079 0.1077 0.1130 0.1156 0.1224 0.1136
% Poor 0.1502 0.1478 0.1484 0.1433 0.1449 0.1233
Median Income/10k 5.2157 5.2130 5.1759 5.3520 5.2803 5.2007
% above 100k 0.1713 0.1721 0.1698 0.1798 0.1721 0.1704
% below 50k 0.5308 0.5288 0.5291 0.5135 0.5151 0.5034
% vacant 0.1143 0.1167 0.1170 0.1149 0.1171 0.1809
% rented 0.3215 0.3173 0.3032 0.2961 0.3165 0.2109
% Low Wage Workers home 0.2586 0.2574 0.2586 0.2518 0.2431 0.2541
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.3910 0.3893 0.3880 0.3819 0.3887 0.3878
% High Wage Workers home 0.3504 0.3532 0.3534 0.3663 0.3682 0.3581
% Low Wage Workers work 0.3248 0.3238 0.3183 0.3152 0.3053 0.2821
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.4071 0.4064 0.4061 0.4027 0.4067 0.4089
% High Wage Workers work 0.2681 0.2698 0.2756 0.2821 0.2880 0.3090
Residential Density (HU/acre) 2.3884 2.2891 1.8506 1.8943 1.9866 0.2787
Population Density (people/acre) 5.5216 5.2602 4.4585 4.6304 4.8501 0.6923
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 1.9869 1.8857 1.4249 1.4042 1.3108 0.2589
Industrial Employment Density 0.2926 0.2836 0.2586 0.2705 0.2910 0.0782
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 4.3753 4.1748 3.2755 3.2985 3.2974 0.5376
Total Road Network Density 14.055113.746412.822913.106913.2910 3.8731
N (Blockgroups) 17200 15200 7800 4200 1300 1500
Note: c=1: blockgroups in counties with at least one well and at least one well
within 5 km of one of the blockgroup's centroid. 20km, 10km, 5km and 1.5km are
blockgroups where c=1 and whose centroid is within the indicated distance to at
least one fracking well. `bgs with wells' are blockgroups where c=1 and at least one
well is within the blockgroup's boundaries.
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Table C.3. Fracking wells in the 5 States, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.614 0.632 -0.018*** 0.636 0.583 0.053***
% African American 0.115 0.092 0.023*** 0.09 0.113 -0.022***
% Hispanic 0.213 0.224 -0.011*** 0.221 0.26 -0.039***
% No Highschool 0.110 0.108 0.002** 0.107 0.122 -0.016***
% Bachelor or higher 0.176 0.164 0.012*** 0.166 0.14 0.026***
% Poor 0.148 0.15 -0.002 0.151 0.145 0.006
Median Income/10k 5.407 5.216 0.192*** 5.21 5.28 -0.070
% Above 100k 0.186 0.171 0.015*** 0.171 0.172 -0.001
% Below 50k 0.516 0.531 -0.015*** 0.532 0.515 0.017***
% Vacant 0.113 0.114 -0.001 0.114 0.117 -0.003
% Rented 0.326 0.322 0.004 0.322 0.317 0.005
% Low Wage Workers home 0.257 0.259 -0.002*** 0.26 0.243 0.017***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.377 0.391 -0.014*** 0.391 0.389 0.002
% High Wage Workers, home 0.367 0.35 0.016*** 0.349 0.368 -0.019***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.324 0.325 -0.001 0.326 0.305 0.021***
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.397 0.407 -0.010*** 0.407 0.407 0.000
% High Wage Workers work 0.279 0.268 0.011*** 0.266 0.288 -0.022***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 3.823 2.388 1.435*** 2.422 1.987 0.436***
Population Density (people/acre) 8.729 5.522 3.207*** 5.578 4.85 0.728***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 3.000 1.987 1.013*** 2.044 1.311 0.733***
Industrial Employment Density 0.421 0.293 0.128*** 0.293 0.291 0.002
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 6.823 4.375 2.448*** 4.467 3.297 1.169***
Total Road Network Density 15.382 14.055 1.327*** 14.12 13.291 0.829***
N (Blockgroups) 15411 17209 15866 1343
Note: c is a dummy indicating whether a blockgroups is in the sample, where c=1 are
blockgroups in counties with at least one well, and at least one well within 5km of one
of the blockgroup's centroid and c=0 are blockgroups in counties without fracking.
k is a dummy for blockgroups in sample, where k=1 indicates that the blockgroup's
centroid is within 1.5km of at least one fracking well, thus the population in this
blockgroup lives in proximity to fracking activity, k=0 are blockgroups where c=1,
but no fracking well is within 1.5km of the blockgroup's centroid. *** Signicant at
0.01; ** Signicant at 0.5; * Signicant at 0.05.
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Table C.4. Fracking wells in the 5 States, urban
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.56 0.581 -0.021*** 0.587 0.511 0.076***
% African American 0.138 0.107 0.031*** 0.104 0.138 -0.033***
% Hispanic 0.244 0.256 -0.012*** 0.252 0.304 -0.052***
% No Highschool 0.112 0.108 0.004*** 0.106 0.127 -0.020***
% Bachelor or higher 0.184 0.175 0.009*** 0.177 0.146 0.031***
% Poor 0.156 0.158 -0.002 0.158 0.155 0.004
Median Income/10k 5.458 5.27 0.188*** 5.268 5.293 -0.025
% Above 100k 0.19 0.175 0.015*** 0.176 0.172 0.003
% Below 50k 0.519 0.534 -0.014*** 0.535 0.52 0.015**
% Vacant 0.1 0.101 -0.001 0.101 0.1 0.002
% Rented 0.357 0.357 -0.001 0.358 0.353 0.005
% Low Wage Workers home 0.253 0.259 -0.006*** 0.26 0.24 0.020***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.373 0.39 -0.017*** 0.39 0.392 -0.002
% High Wage Workers, home 0.374 0.351 0.022*** 0.35 0.368 -0.018***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.325 0.33 -0.005** 0.332 0.311 0.021***
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.392 0.405 -0.013*** 0.404 0.41 -0.005
% High Wage Workers work 0.283 0.265 0.018*** 0.264 0.279 -0.016***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 4.685 2.961 1.724*** 2.996 2.532 0.465***
Population Density (people/acre) 10.713 6.848 3.865*** 6.903 6.184 0.719***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 3.649 2.465 1.185*** 2.531 1.663 0.867***
Industrial Employment Density 0.508 0.359 0.149*** 0.359 0.364 -0.006
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 8.334 5.426 2.908*** 5.527 4.195 1.332***
Total Road Network Density 18.185 16.821 1.364*** 16.864 16.296 0.568**
N (Blockgroups) 12318 13739 12694 1045
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.5. Fracking wells in Colorado, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.708 0.715 -0.006 0.714 0.725 -0.011
% African American 0.033 0.037 -0.004 0.040 0.004 0.036***
% Hispanic 0.213 0.189 0.024*** 0.186 0.235 -0.049***
% No Highschool 0.076 0.070 0.006** 0.069 0.084 -0.015**
% Bachelor or higher 0.254 0.226 0.027*** 0.229 0.184 0.045***
% Poor 0.121 0.119 0.002 0.121 0.091 0.030**
Median Income/10k 6.090 6.199 -0.109 6.153 6.939 -0.786***
% Above 100k 0.230 0.228 0.002 0.225 0.271 -0.045**
% Below 50k 0.459 0.445 0.014* 0.451 0.357 0.094***
% Vacant 0.122 0.080 0.042*** 0.080 0.084 -0.004
% Rented 0.308 0.319 -0.011 0.326 0.210 0.115***
% Low Wage Workers home 0.253 0.246 0.006*** 0.247 0.234 0.013***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.366 0.375 -0.009*** 0.376 0.366 0.01
% High Wage Workers, home 0.381 0.379 0.002 0.377 0.400 -0.022**
% Low Wage Workers work 0.314 0.311 0.003 0.313 0.274 0.039**
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.388 0.386 0.002 0.387 0.377 0.01
% High Wage Workers work 0.298 0.303 -0.005 0.300 0.349 -0.049***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 3.411 2.912 0.498*** 3.035 0.937 2.098***
Population Density (people/acre) 6.904 6.887 0.016 7.163 2.470 4.692***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 3.431 1.992 1.438*** 2.079 0.603 1.475***
Industrial Employment Density 0.373 0.250 0.123** 0.257 0.138 0.119*
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 6.841 4.904 1.937*** 5.114 1.540 3.574***
Total Road Network Density 14.932 15.053 -0.122 15.462 8.488 6.974***
N (Blockgroups) 1673 1859 1750 109
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.6. Fracking wells in Colorado, urban
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.677 0.699 -0.022** 0.698 0.7 -0.001
% African American 0.039 0.041 -0.002 0.043 0.005 0.038***
% Hispanic 0.236 0.199 0.037*** 0.196 0.26 -0.064***
% No Highschool 0.079 0.072 0.008*** 0.071 0.085 -0.014*
% Bachelor or higher 0.259 0.225 0.034*** 0.227 0.184 0.043**
% Poor 0.126 0.124 0.001 0.126 0.102 0.024*
Median Income/10k 6.115 6.12 -0.005 6.086 6.772 -0.686**
% Above 100k 0.232 0.223 0.009 0.221 0.253 -0.032
% Below 50k 0.462 0.452 0.01 0.456 0.372 0.084***
% Vacant 0.092 0.071 0.020*** 0.071 0.074 -0.002
% Rented 0.334 0.334 0.001 0.34 0.221 0.119***
% Low Wage Workers home 0.242 0.245 -0.004* 0.246 0.237 0.009*
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.364 0.378 -0.014*** 0.379 0.363 0.016
% High Wage Workers, home 0.395 0.377 0.018*** 0.375 0.401 -0.025*
% Low Wage Workers work 0.311 0.312 -0.001 0.314 0.284 0.03
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.384 0.387 -0.002 0.387 0.379 0.008
% High Wage Workers work 0.305 0.301 0.004 0.299 0.337 -0.038*
Residential Density (HU/acre) 4.182 3.251 0.931*** 3.357 1.22 2.136***
Population Density (people/acre) 8.473 7.691 0.782*** 7.924 3.219 4.705***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 4.206 2.225 1.981*** 2.3 0.782 1.517***
Industrial Employment Density 0.453 0.278 0.176*** 0.283 0.17 0.113
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 8.388 5.475 2.912*** 5.656 2.003 3.653***
Total Road Network Density 17.85 16.488 1.362*** 16.808 10.33 6.478***
N (Blockgroups) 1356 1658 1576 82
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.7. Fracking wells in Adams versus Boulder County, Colorado
Adams Boulder
Variable k5=0 k5=1 MeanDi k5=0 k5=1 MeanDi
% White 0.614 0.632 -0.018*** 0.636 0.583 0.053***
% African American 0.115 0.092 0.023*** 0.09 0.113 -0.022***
% Hispanic 0.213 0.224 -0.011*** 0.221 0.26 -0.039***
% No Highschool 0.110 0.108 0.002** 0.107 0.122 -0.016***
% Bachelor or higher 0.176 0.164 0.012*** 0.166 0.14 0.026***
% Poor 0.148 0.15 -0.002 0.151 0.145 0.006
Median Income/10k 5.407 5.216 0.192*** 5.21 5.28 -0.070
% Above 100k 0.186 0.171 0.015*** 0.171 0.172 -0.001
% Below 50k 0.516 0.531 -0.015*** 0.532 0.515 0.017***
% Vacant 0.113 0.114 -0.001 0.114 0.117 -0.003
% Rented 0.326 0.322 0.004 0.322 0.317 0.005
% Low Wage Workers home 0.257 0.259 -0.002*** 0.26 0.243 0.017***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.377 0.391 -0.014*** 0.391 0.389 0.002
% High Wage Workers, home 0.367 0.35 0.016*** 0.349 0.368 -0.019***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.324 0.325 -0.001 0.326 0.305 0.021***
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.397 0.407 -0.010*** 0.407 0.407 0.000
% High Wage Workers work 0.279 0.268 0.011*** 0.266 0.288 -0.022***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 3.823 2.388 1.435*** 2.422 1.987 0.436***
Population Density (people/acre) 8.729 5.522 3.207*** 5.578 4.85 0.728***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 3.000 1.987 1.013*** 2.044 1.311 0.733***
Industrial Employment Density 0.421 0.293 0.128*** 0.293 0.291 0.002
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 6.823 4.375 2.448*** 4.467 3.297 1.169***
Total Road Network Density 15.382 14.055 1.327*** 14.12 13.291 0.829***
N (Blockgroups) 225 35 168 32
Note: k5 is a dummy for blockgroups in the sample, where k5=1 indicates that the
blockgroup's centroid is within 5 kilometers of at least one fracking well.
121
Table C.8. Fracking wells in North Dakota, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.900 0.892 0.008 0.915 0.756 0.160**
% African American 0.009 0.003 0.006* 0.003 0.004 -0.001
% Hispanic 0.020 0.017 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.001
% No Highschool 0.075 0.083 -0.008 0.081 0.100 -0.019
% Bachelor or higher 0.165 0.141 0.024** 0.142 0.130 0.012
% Poor 0.133 0.107 0.026* 0.105 0.122 -0.017
Median Income/10k 4.760 5.194 -0.434* 5.210 5.099 0.111
% Above 100k 0.135 0.174 -0.039*** 0.177 0.159 0.018
% Below 50k 0.540 0.482 0.059** 0.476 0.517 -0.041
% Vacant 0.112 0.141 -0.028** 0.130 0.205 -0.075*
% Rented 0.311 0.243 0.068** 0.235 0.290 -0.055
% Low Wage Workers home 0.308 0.277 0.031*** 0.273 0.296 -0.023*
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.382 0.318 0.064*** 0.316 0.327 -0.011
% High Wage Workers, home 0.310 0.406 -0.095*** 0.410 0.377 0.034*
% Low Wage Workers work 0.343 0.281 0.062*** 0.289 0.234 0.056
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.367 0.306 0.061*** 0.301 0.334 -0.033
% High Wage Workers work 0.290 0.413 -0.123*** 0.410 0.432 -0.023
Residential Density (HU/acre) 1.780 0.873 0.907 1.004 0.099 0.905**
Population Density (people/acre) 3.683 1.957 1.726 2.249 0.238 2.011**
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 2.118 1.074 1.044 1.213 0.255 0.958
Industrial Employment Density 0.309 0.210 0.099 0.236 0.060 0.176
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 3.898 1.947 1.951 2.217 0.354 1.863*
Total Road Network Density 9.731 8.399 1.333 9.361 2.730 6.631**
N (Blockgroups) 510 62 53 9
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.9. Fracking wells in Oklahoma, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.697 0.685 0.012 0.688 0.579 0.109***
% African American 0.048 0.095 -0.048*** 0.090 0.283 -0.193***
% Hispanic 0.063 0.093 -0.030*** 0.094 0.045 0.049**
% No Highschool 0.105 0.100 0.005* 0.099 0.139 -0.039***
% Bachelor or higher 0.126 0.150 -0.024*** 0.151 0.110 0.041**
% Poor 0.169 0.164 0.005 0.163 0.220 -0.057***
Median Income/10k 4.286 4.582 -0.295*** 4.601 3.851 0.751**
% Above 100k 0.112 0.131 -0.019*** 0.132 0.097 0.035*
% Below 50k 0.595 0.586 0.009 0.585 0.642 -0.057**
% Vacant 0.141 0.132 0.009** 0.131 0.179 -0.048***
% Rented 0.293 0.333 -0.040*** 0.333 0.344 -0.011
% Low Wage Workers home 0.270 0.271 -0.001 0.270 0.299 -0.030***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.446 0.438 0.008*** 0.438 0.443 -0.005
% High Wage Workers, home 0.284 0.291 -0.007** 0.292 0.258 0.034**
% Low Wage Workers work 0.330 0.338 -0.008 0.338 0.336 0.002
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.448 0.430 0.018*** 0.431 0.418 0.013
% High Wage Workers work 0.222 0.232 -0.01 0.231 0.247 -0.015
Residential Density (HU/acre) 0.932 1.760 -0.829*** 1.772 1.356 0.416
Population Density (people/acre) 2.104 3.802 -1.698*** 3.840 2.394 1.446***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 0.837 1.704 -0.867*** 1.702 1.772 -0.07
Industrial Employment Density 0.109 0.245 -0.136*** 0.251 0.034 0.217
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 1.768 3.464 -1.696*** 3.473 3.128 0.346
Total Road Network Density 8.664 12.582 -3.918*** 12.636 10.627 2.008*
N (Blockgroups) 970 1995 1942 53
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.10. Fracking wells in Oklahoma, urban
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.682 0.648 0.034*** 0.653 0.382 0.271***
% African American 0.068 0.118 -0.050*** 0.11 0.49 -0.380***
% Hispanic 0.08 0.111 -0.031*** 0.113 0.049 0.064**
% No Highschool 0.095 0.098 -0.004 0.097 0.162 -0.065***
% Bachelor or higher 0.143 0.161 -0.018*** 0.162 0.103 0.059**
% Poor 0.179 0.174 0.005 0.171 0.292 -0.121***
Median Income/10k 4.334 4.564 -0.230* 4.593 3.129 1.464***
% Above 100k 0.115 0.131 -0.015** 0.132 0.068 0.064**
% Below 50k 0.596 0.597 0 0.594 0.724 -0.130***
% Vacant 0.115 0.121 -0.005 0.12 0.166 -0.046**
% Rented 0.366 0.382 -0.017 0.381 0.451 -0.07
% Low Wage Workers home 0.279 0.274 0.005** 0.273 0.326 -0.053***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.445 0.441 0.004 0.441 0.464 -0.024
% High Wage Workers, home 0.276 0.285 -0.009 0.286 0.21 0.077***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.351 0.35 0.001 0.35 0.368 -0.018
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.438 0.43 0.008 0.43 0.42 0.01
% High Wage Workers work 0.21 0.22 -0.009 0.22 0.212 0.008
Residential Density (HU/acre) 1.622 2.342 -0.720*** 2.342 2.383 -0.042
Population Density (people/acre) 3.67 5.057 -1.388*** 5.075 4.199 0.876
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 1.473 2.277 -0.804*** 2.26 3.125 -0.865
Industrial Employment Density 0.188 0.326 -0.138** 0.332 0.058 0.273
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 3.096 4.62 -1.524*** 4.601 5.509 -0.907
Total Road Network Density 13.404 15.957 -2.553*** 15.928 17.388 -1.46
N (Blockgroups) 538 1483 1453 30
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.11. Fracking wells in Pennylvania, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.725 0.895 -0.170*** 0.892 0.967 -0.076***
% African American 0.154 0.064 0.090*** 0.066 0.011 0.055***
% Hispanic 0.074 0.015 0.059*** 0.016 0.009 0.007**
% No Highschool 0.096 0.081 0.015*** 0.081 0.089 -0.008*
% Bachelor or higher 0.178 0.157 0.021*** 0.159 0.114 0.045***
% Poor 0.131 0.134 -0.003 0.135 0.120 0.015
Median Income/10k 5.638 4.632 1.006*** 4.633 4.598 0.036
% Above 100k 0.199 0.133 0.066*** 0.133 0.121 0.012
% Below 50k 0.490 0.565 -0.075*** 0.565 0.549 0.016
% Vacant 0.092 0.124 -0.032*** 0.123 0.158 -0.035***
% Rented 0.304 0.281 0.022*** 0.285 0.197 0.088***
% Low Wage Workers home 0.251 0.271 -0.020*** 0.271 0.260 0.011***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.357 0.382 -0.025*** 0.382 0.380 0.002
% High Wage Workers, home 0.391 0.347 0.044*** 0.347 0.360 -0.013*
% Low Wage Workers work 0.329 0.338 -0.009*** 0.337 0.361 -0.023
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.372 0.386 -0.014*** 0.386 0.383 0.003
% High Wage Workers work 0.300 0.276 0.024*** 0.277 0.257 0.02
Residential Density (HU/acre) 5.816 2.384 3.432*** 2.466 0.286 2.181***
Population Density (people/acre) 13.218 4.899 8.319*** 5.067 0.625 4.442***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 3.912 2.438 1.475*** 2.523 0.271 2.252*
Industrial Employment Density 0.462 0.327 0.135*** 0.336 0.082 0.255***
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 9.728 4.821 4.907*** 4.989 0.557 4.433***
Total Road Network Density 17.781 13.525 4.256*** 13.881 4.508 9.373***
N (Blockgroups) 6022 3718 3577 141
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.12. Fracking wells in Pennylvania, urban
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.686 0.858 -0.172*** 0.857 0.942 -0.086**
% African American 0.178 0.091 0.088*** 0.091 0.036 0.055
% Hispanic 0.083 0.019 0.064*** 0.019 0.007 0.012
% No Highschool 0.095 0.075 0.020*** 0.075 0.079 -0.003
% Bachelor or higher 0.185 0.178 0.007** 0.179 0.127 0.052**
% Poor 0.141 0.147 -0.007* 0.147 0.153 -0.006
Median Income/10k 5.597 4.608 0.989*** 4.613 4.172 0.441
% Above 100k 0.199 0.138 0.061*** 0.138 0.111 0.027
% Below 50k 0.5 0.574 -0.074*** 0.574 0.582 -0.008
% Vacant 0.088 0.109 -0.021*** 0.109 0.091 0.018
% Rented 0.329 0.336 -0.007 0.337 0.304 0.033
% Low Wage Workers home 0.25 0.272 -0.022*** 0.272 0.257 0.015*
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.356 0.376 -0.020*** 0.376 0.373 0.003
% High Wage Workers, home 0.394 0.352 0.041*** 0.352 0.371 -0.018
% Low Wage Workers work 0.329 0.338 -0.009** 0.337 0.398 -0.061*
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.368 0.381 -0.013*** 0.381 0.358 0.023
% High Wage Workers work 0.304 0.282 0.022*** 0.282 0.243 0.039
Residential Density (HU/acre) 6.782 3.399 3.383*** 3.42 1.201 2.219***
Population Density (people/acre) 15.414 6.979 8.435*** 7.021 2.667 4.354***
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 4.562 3.483 1.079** 3.507 1.099 2.408
Industrial Employment Density 0.534 0.455 0.079* 0.457 0.268 0.189
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 11.343 6.882 4.461*** 6.927 2.3 4.627
Total Road Network Density 20.198 18.095 2.103*** 18.162 11.246 6.917***
N (Blockgroups) 5143 2560 2535 25
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.13. Fracking wells in Texas, urban and rural
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.445 0.500 -0.056*** 0.499 0.514 -0.016
% African American 0.119 0.114 0.005* 0.112 0.130 -0.019***
% Hispanic 0.387 0.341 0.046*** 0.344 0.310 0.035***
% No Highschool 0.137 0.127 0.010*** 0.127 0.130 -0.003
% Bachelor or higher 0.162 0.158 0.004* 0.160 0.141 0.019***
% Poor 0.170 0.160 0.011*** 0.161 0.150 0.010**
Median Income/10k 5.228 5.384 -0.156*** 5.398 5.274 0.124
% Above 100k 0.177 0.184 -0.006** 0.185 0.173 0.012**
% Below 50k 0.542 0.523 0.019*** 0.523 0.520 0.003
% Vacant 0.127 0.113 0.014*** 0.113 0.111 0.002
% Rented 0.359 0.336 0.023*** 0.335 0.343 -0.008
% Low Wage Workers home 0.256 0.254 0.003*** 0.255 0.238 0.017***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.387 0.388 -0.001 0.388 0.390 -0.002
% High Wage Workers, home 0.356 0.358 -0.002 0.357 0.372 -0.015***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.319 0.320 -0.001 0.322 0.301 0.021***
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.420 0.415 0.005** 0.415 0.413 0.003
% High Wage Workers work 0.262 0.265 -0.003 0.262 0.286 -0.024***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 2.626 2.429 0.197*** 2.435 2.379 0.056
Population Density (people/acre) 6.327 5.880 0.448*** 5.884 5.846 0.038
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 2.412 1.876 0.536*** 1.920 1.513 0.406*
Industrial Employment Density 0.451 0.298 0.154*** 0.291 0.351 -0.06
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 5.038 4.305 0.733*** 4.355 3.892 0.462
Total Road Network Density 14.693 14.411 0.283** 14.312 15.229 -0.917***
N (Blockgroups) 6236 9575 8544 1031
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.14. Fracking wells in Texas, urban
Variable c=0 c=1 MeanDi k=0 k=1 MeanDi
% White 0.396 0.456 -0.060*** 0.453 0.486 -0.033***
% African American 0.131 0.124 0.007** 0.122 0.141 -0.019***
% Hispanic 0.419 0.369 0.049*** 0.375 0.324 0.051***
% No Highschool 0.138 0.127 0.011*** 0.127 0.13 -0.004
% Bachelor or higher 0.168 0.166 0.002 0.169 0.145 0.024***
% Poor 0.177 0.165 0.011*** 0.167 0.155 0.012**
Median Income/10k 5.268 5.434 -0.167*** 5.457 5.259 0.197*
% Above 100k 0.178 0.186 -0.008** 0.188 0.17 0.017**
% Below 50k 0.545 0.526 0.019*** 0.526 0.525 0.002
% Vacant 0.113 0.101 0.012*** 0.101 0.1 0.001
% Rented 0.388 0.364 0.024*** 0.365 0.363 0.002
% Low Wage Workers home 0.256 0.254 0.001 0.256 0.237 0.019***
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.385 0.387 -0.002 0.387 0.392 -0.006
% High Wage Workers, home 0.359 0.358 0.001 0.357 0.37 -0.013***
% Low Wage Workers work 0.323 0.328 -0.005 0.33 0.309 0.021***
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.414 0.412 0.002 0.411 0.414 -0.002
% High Wage Workers work 0.264 0.261 0.003 0.258 0.277 -0.019***
Residential Density (HU/acre) 3.084 2.876 0.208*** 2.899 2.692 0.208
Population Density (people/acre) 7.428 6.963 0.465*** 7.008 6.614 0.394
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 2.84 2.225 0.615*** 2.29 1.71 0.580**
Industrial Employment Density 0.53 0.351 0.179*** 0.346 0.395 -0.049
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 5.923 5.1 0.823*** 5.189 4.402 0.787**
Total Road Network Density 16.797 16.643 0.154 16.606 16.938 -0.332
N (Blockgroups) 5281 8038 7130 908
Note: see table C.3
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Table C.15. High Density Fracking, blockgroups with more than 50, 100 and 500
wells
Number of Wells  1 >50 >100 >500
% White 0.7591 0.7371 0.7282 0.5631
% African American 0.0465 0.0119 0.0118 0.0172
% Hispanic 0.1553 0.2097 0.2337 0.3975
% No Highschool 0.1136 0.1293 0.1348 0.1671
% Bachelor or higher 0.1268 0.1159 0.1091 0.1025
% Poor 0.1233 0.1118 0.1013 0.1390
Median Income/10k 5.2007 5.3890 5.4937 5.0006
% Above 100k 0.1704 0.1827 0.1960 0.1895
% Below 50k 0.5034 0.4807 0.4668 0.5196
% Vacant 0.1809 0.2288 0.2446 0.2261
% Rented 0.2109 0.2086 0.2115 0.3028
% Low Wage Workers home 0.2541 0.2570 0.2516 0.2506
% Medium Wage Workers home 0.3878 0.3698 0.3643 0.3684
% High Wage Workers, home 0.3581 0.3732 0.3841 0.3811
% Low Wage Workers work 0.2821 0.2624 0.2432 0.1854
% Medium Wage Workers work 0.4089 0.3685 0.3676 0.4063
% High Wage Workers work 0.3090 0.3691 0.3893 0.4083
Residential Density (HU/acre) 0.2787 0.0133 0.0077 0.0017
Population Density (people/acre) 0.6923 0.0299 0.0175 0.0039
Employment Density (jobs/acre) 0.2589 0.0068 0.0037 0.0012
Industrial Employment Density 0.0782 0.0041 0.0024 0.0010
Activity Density (HU+jobs) 0.5376 0.0202 0.0114 0.0030
Total Road Network Density 3.8731 1.3206 1.1097 0.7048
N (Blockgroups) 1558 149 83 14
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